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ABSTRACT
This paper evaluates the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA)
program for firms, a federal program created by the Trade
Act of 1974, which authorizes the federal government to
provide up to $4 million in financial and technical assis-
tance to firms that have been hurt by foreign competition.
The goal of the program is to make firms more competitive
through management improvements, new product development,
more efficient production processes, or marketing programs.
It looks at the program from two different angles, using
three case studies of assisted firms in the New England region
and other evidence: 1) How effective has the program been in
meeting its goal of making firms more competitive? and
2) What lessons does it provide for the development of federal
and state policies for dealing with the problems of troubled
firms in industries facing declining competitiveness?
The paper concludes that, in spite of administrative and
political problems which have reduced its efficiency, the
program has had a positive impact on the economic performance
of assisted firms.
A major policy conclusion of the paper is that it is possible
for the government to save some troubled firms and, further,
that the government should attempt to save economically viable
firms as long as aid is conditioned on explicit agreements to
increase the competitiveness of the firm and account for the
interests of workers. The paper also points out that govern-
ment policy can alter the business climate in ways that
promote the economic viability of firms.
Management failure, rather than high labor costs, was found to
be the most significant cause of firm failure in all three
case studies. This finding implies that the competitive
restructuring of American firms and industries will require,
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in addition to an expanded government role, highly creative
business strategies on the part of management. The paper
concludes that the major competitive business strategies
being adopted by U.S. firms--market niches, new product
development, and modernizing the production process--may
restore short-term competitiveness, but it's not clear whether
these strategies will ensure long-range competitiveness.
The paper recommends that the existing TAA program could be
improved by a strong federal commitment, reducing time delays,
and involving employees in planning the reorganization of
firms.
The paper concludes that if state programs for aiding troubled
firms are to be effective, they should be able to deliver
services promptly, enjoy stability, be insulated from local
politics, and focus on providing technical assistance.
However, the TAA program's experience suggests that states
are limited in what they can do by macroeconomic factors
they have no control over, such as the strength of the dollar.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Bennett Harrison
Title: Professor of Political Economy and Planning
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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Introduction
In this paper I will analyze the Trade Adjustment
Assistance (TAA) program for firms. This program, created by
the Trade Act of 1974, authorizes the federal government to
provide up to $4 million in financial and technical assistance
to firms that have been hurt by foreign competition. The goal
of the program is to make firms more competitive through
management improvements, new product development, more
efficient production processes, or marketing programs.
The TAA program is important to look at because it has ten
years of experience in dealing with the same issues that states
and the federal government are now taking up in the current
debate over industrial policy. Can troubled firms in declining
industries be saved? Should they be saved? Should government
take a new, expanded role in making America's industries more
competitive, and if so, what strategies will work?
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the process
of firm turnarounds under the TAA program and the program's
implications for economic adjustment policy, rather than
conducting a rigorous program evaluation. After presenting
some background information on the TAA program, I will develop
three case studies of assisted firms in the New England region.
Next I will perform a rough evaluation of the program, using
the case studies and other evidence to determine the program's
impacts and efficiency of service ,delivery. Then I will
analyze the case studies to determine what they reveal about
why firms fail and how the process of firm reorganization works
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under the TAA program. The case studies also raise many issues
related to competitive business strategy and industrial policy,
which I deal with more fully in the final chapter.
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Background and Methodology of Study
The idea for this thesis grew out of research I performed
for the Massachusetts Governors Commission on the Future of
Mature Industries in the fall and winter of 1983. The Commis-
sion was grappling with the issue of how to assist firms in
declining Massachusetts industries. It was considering form-
ing a state "rescue squad" which could, through financial and
technical assistance, turn around troubled but economically
viable firms in order to prevent plant closings.
I was assigned to research the trade adjustment assistance
program for firms because it was felt by some Commission staff
that this program attempted to do exactly what the Commission
proposed for the Commonwealth. Since the New England Trade
Adjustment Assistance Center (NETAAC) had a track record in
New England, it made sense to look at what Massachusetts
policymakers could learn from its experience in designing the
state's "industrial extension service."
In November and December of 1983, I conducted phone inter-
views with a sample of firms who'd been certified for TAA by
the Department of Commerce. The firms were selected from the
Department of Commerce's Certification Calendar for Firms Under
Trade Act of 1974 to cover a range of industries and time
periods. The purpose of these interviews was to determine the
history of the firms, the impact of imports, NETAAC's diagnosis
of the firm's problems, what financial and technical assistance
the firms received from NETAAC and consultants, impacts of
adjustment assistance on employees, the firm's evaluation of
those services, and its overall evaluation of the program.
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(See Appendix I for questionnaire.) I contacted 10 firms, but
only interviewed 5 because the others had gone out of business
or experienced a change of ownership. I interviewed by phone
and in-person New England TAAC staff, consultants, and others
who had researched or been involved in the program. I also
conducted background research on the program.
On Jan-uary 3, 1984, I submitted a memo to the Commission
summarizing my findings on the TAA program for firms and dis-
cussing its relevance for the formation of a state industrial
extension service.
After I decided to study the TAA program for my thesis, I
approached the topic in a more in-depth and systematic way.
In March and April of 1984, I conducted another round of inter-
views with certified firms. These firms were selected by the
same process as before. I also researched the literature to
find successful cases of assisted firms.
My previous research had led me to believe that the
program was fraught with problems which reduced its effective-
ness. These problems were mainly caused by the long time
periods required for assistance (up to two years from applica-
tion for certification to receipt of financial assistance) due
to the federal bureaucracy, and discontinuity in the program
due to continued threats to its funding by the Reagan
administration.
I didn't want to focus on the horror stories of the TAA
program for my thesis, although I uncovered many. Instead I
wanted to focus on how the process of trade adjustment assistance
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can work, how troubled firms in declining American indusries
can be made more competitive. I wanted to illustrate the pro-
cess of turning around a business because this is one of the
key issues of economic adjustment that state and federal
policymakers are now groping with, and I believe that the TAA
program offers some valuable lessons in this regard. I also
feel that many of the problems associated with the program,
since they are due to political mismanagement at the federal
level, could be overcome if these same procedures were applied
by state programs with a faster response time and a strong
commitment to the program.
As of March 28, I had conducted interviews with another 8
firms, out of a total of 12 firms contacted. From these contacts
and a literature search I came up with three case studies which
I believe illustrate how the process of trade adjustment
assistance for firms can work, as well as some of the more
interesting problems involved in the program and the process
of economic adjustment in general.
These three case studies comprise the core of my analysis
of the TAA program for firms. Through conducting personal and
phone interviews with management, collecting printed informa-
tion provided by firms on their products, and by combing the
business press for articles on these firms, I was able to
assemble three in-depth portraits of the process of trade
adjustment assistance. The three case studies cover firms in
three different trade-impacted New England industries--miniature
precision ball bearings, textile machinery, and jewelry. They
also illustrate three different economic adjustment responses
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in firms threatened by foreign competition--technological im-
provements in the production process, new product development
and market niche strategies, and new and improved management.
My interview procedure attempted to get at the same
questions as did my earlier round of interviews, but in
greater detail. (See Appendix II for questionnaire.) These
firm interviews were longer (30-60 minutes in length versus
approximately 15 minutes for the first wave of interviews).
They included interviews with the firms' management and TAA
consultants. Two of the three firms were assisted by the
NETAAC. The third received assistance from the New York State
TAAC in Binghampton because the parent company of the firm is
headquartered in New York, even though the assisted firm is in
Massachusetts. I've included this firm in my case studies
because the purpose of my thesis is more to understand the
process of TAA for firms rather than conducting a narrow program
evaluation of the NETAAC, and this case illustrates some inter-
esting features of the program. In order to obtain information
on this firm, a manufacturer of mini precision ball bearings,
I had to assure the management and consultants of confidenti-
ality. Therefore, I've changed the names of the firms, indi-
viduals, and locations so as not to reveal the identity of this
firm. I've used the real names and locations for my other two
case studies, since they wanted others to learn about what the
TAA program had done for them.
Finally, I conducted another set of interviews with the
federal Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance, industry
analysts, trade associations, and others involved with the TAA
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program in order to answer questions about the program which
came up in my case studies.
Two points must be made clear about the approach taken in
this thesis. First, it is really an analysis of the process
of firm turnaround under the TAA program, and not a rigorous
program evaluation. It is necessary to provide at least a
rough evaluation of the program, but the emphasis of the paper
is on how the program goes about turning around firms and the
policy implications of the program. Second, this is a study
of the trade adjustment assistance program for firms. There
are also TAA programs for workers, industries, and communities,
and the worker assistance program is probably the best known
of the four. This paper is not concerned with these other
programs.
I attempt to evaluate the program in terms of the impact
of assistance on firms and the efficiency of service delivery.
The ultimate criterion for success is whether or not trade
adjustment assistance appears to have made the firms more
competitive. My procedure for evaluating the program is to
compare the survival rate of firms assisted by the program
with the overall U.S. small business survival rate, summarize
the results of my other firm interviews regarding the effi-
ciency of service delivery, summarize other studies on the
TAA program for firms, and analyze the case studies to
determine the impacts of the TAA program on each firm.
I believe that the most interesting part of my thesis is
analyzing the process of trade adjustment assistance as
11
revealed in the case studies and drawing out its implications
for economic adjustment policy. This emphasis on the actual
process of firm turnaround sets my thesis apart from other
more quantitative studies of the TAA program. I also focus
more than other studies on how the interests of workers are
affected by the TAA program for firms since this is one of
the program conditions and, further, I believe that this should
be a quid pro quo for government assistance to private industry.
The March 1984 draft report of the Mature Industries
Commission refers to some of the recommendations in my 1/3/84
memo, and it recommends the establishment of a Massachusetts
Industrial Service Program to provide assistance to economically
viable but troubled firms. Perhaps this document will be useful
to Massachusetts state policymakers involved in the creation
of this institution. Hopefully, it will also be helpful for
policymakers in other states and planners concerned with
economic adjustment policy at the national level.
I would like to acknowledge the following persons who
assisted me in writing this thesis: Beth Siegel, Worker and
Community Assistance Taskforce, Massachusetts Governors
Commission on the Future of Mature Industries, who interested
me in the topic and offered valuable criticism while I re-
searched the program for the Commission and as my thesis
reader; Bennett Harrison, Professor of Political Economy and
Planning, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, MIT, who
as my thesis advisor provided valuable feedback during the
writing of my thesis; and Michael Schlein, a graduate student
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in the MIT departments of economics and political science,
who has just completed his master's thesis on the Footwear
Revitalization Program, an industry-wide TAA program, and its
relevance for industrial policy and who provided me with much
useful information on the TAA program for firms.
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Chapter 1. The Trade Adjustment Assistance Program for Firms
The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program for firms
is authorized by the Trade Act of 1974. The legislation also
provides for assistance to industries, workers, and communities
hit by imports, but this paper is concerned only with the
program for firms.
History of the Trade Act of 1974
A detailed analysis of the history of the Trade Act of
1974 is a subject worthy of an entire thesis and beyond the
scope of this paper, but it is necessary to give some
background here.
Some observers view trade adjustment assistance as a
political concession given by free trade advocates to facilitate
the passage of liberal free trade legislation and erode
protectionist pressures from organized labor and industries
hit by imports.1
The roots of trade adjustment assistance go back to the
early 1950's. In 1953, two business lobbying organizations,
the Committee for a National Trade Policy (CNTP) and the
Committee for Economic Development (CED), testified before
the Randall Commission in favor of a free trade policy.
The chairmen of both organizations advocated the concept of
providing subsidies and other aids to firms, communities, and
workers who were injured by imports. They stated that the
1This perspective is developed in Michael Schlein, "Federal
Programs for Mature Industries: Trade Adjustment Assistance
and the Footwear Revitalization Program" (unpublished master's
thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1983 draft).
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proposal "if adopted, could destroy the political basis of
protectionism...."
The proposal received a mixed response. Some factions of
the international business community saw it as a means to
promote free trade, but others were wary of such extensive
government intervention in the market. Republican Congressmen
(who at the time were more on the side of protectionism than
the Democratic Party) strongly opposed the proposal as a
threat to protectionism.3
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 greatly enlarged the
President's authority to expand free trade and contained
provisions for trade adjustment assistance. The bill gave the
President authority to reduce tariffs by up to 50% to increase
trade between the U.S. and Common Market nations. In order
to undercut protectionist opposition to this liberal trade
bill, President Kennedy followed two strategies. First, he
isolated textiles, the most active lobbying group for protec-
tionism, from the rest of the protectionist opposition by
providing the industry with a marketing agreement to restrict
imports and expand exports. Second, having won the support
of the main protectionist opposition, his initiative provided
for adjustment assistance to workers and firms who would be
2 Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, American Business and Public Policy
(New York: Prentice Hall, 1964), p. 43. Cited in Schlein,
"Federal Programs," pp. 17-18.
3 Bauer et al., p. 43. Cited in Schlein, "Federal Programs," p. 18.
4
Robert Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign
Economic Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1980), p. 10. Cited in Schlein, "Federal Programs," p. 24.
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adversely affected by the expanded imports resulting from the
lowering of trade barriers. Worker assistance included trade
readjustment allowance (TRA) benefits, training assistance,
and financial assistance for relocation of workers displaced
by imports. Firm adjustment assistance included technical
assistance, tax benefits to encourage modernization and
diversification, loan guarantees, and direct loans.
The Act was supported by organized labor only because
of the adjustment assistance provisions. George Meany,
President of the AFL-CIO, testified in congressional hearings
that "A trade adjustment assistance program is absolutely
essential to a successful foreign trade policy." Opponents
included representatives of import-impacted industries such
as chemicals and machine tools and small businesses which
supported protectionism over free trade, and not free trade
with adjustment assistance.5 Segments of the business com-
munity that could compete in international markets supported
the bill, and these industries were the main benificiaries
of the Act. "The largest tariff reductions occurred in
industries characterized by advanced technology, a high degree
of product innovation, or dominated by multinational firms."6
The transformation of the U.S. economy from the growth
of the 1960's to the recession of the early 1970's set the
5 James McCarthy, Trade Adjustment Assistance: A Case Study
of the Shoe Industry in Massachusetts, Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston Research Report 58, 1975, pp. 9-13.
6Wilbur Monroe, International Trade Policy in Transition
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1975), p. 19. Cited in
Schlein, "Federal Programs," p. 25.
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stage for passage of the Trade Act of 1974. By this time, many
industries began to feel competitive pressures from imports,
and protectionist demands from labor unions and small businesses
mounted. The AFL-CIO was supporting protectionist measures
(the Burke-Hartke bill, which called for a wide range of quotas
and tariffs) and opposed the solution of free trade with
adjustment assistance.
President Nixon's Trade Reform Act of 1973 proposed to
dismantle adjustment assistance programs in 1973, but the Trade
Act of 1974 passed by Congress strengthened the adjustment
assistance provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
This change was a product of divisions within the Nixon admini-
stration and lobbying by segments of the international business
community which still supported the concept of trade adjustment
assistance. In addition, many congressmen supported TAA as a
way to show their constituents that they were not insensitive
to the job displacement that would result from increased
competition.
The Trade Act of 1974 loosened the eligibility criteria
for industry import relief and adjustment assistance to firms
and workers and it enlarged the President's authority to
lower tariffs. Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, in-
creased imports must have been in major part the result of
trade agreement concessions before an industry could get
import relief. The Trade Act of 1974 removed this link to
7 Schlein, "Federal Programs," pp. 27-29.
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concessions. Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, increased
imports must have been the major factor of injury to an in-
dustry' before it was eligible for relief. The Trade Act of
1974 stated that imports must be only a substantial cause of
serious injury or the threat of injury. The bill expanded
the level of benefits to workers and eliminated tax assistance
to firms. It also added the new category of adjustment
assistance for communities, which included technical assis-
tance, planning grants, public works grants, and financial
assistance. The Trade Act of 1974 also authorized the
President to negotiate trade agreements with other countries
to reduce tariff and nontariff barriers to trade and provided
for relief from unfair trading practices such as foreign
import restrictions, export subsidies, and dumping. 8
The trade adjustment assistance provisions of the Trade
Act of 1974 were amended by Congress in 1981. The amendments
specified the types of technical assistance to be offered and
the conditions for providing financial assistance to firms. 9
The TAA Program for Firms
The TAA program authorizes the federal government to pro-
vide technical and financial assistance to eligible firms. It
is administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Until
8 U.S. Code, Congressional and Administrative News, 93rd Congress,
2nd Session, 1974 (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1974),
pp. 7200-7208.
U.S. Code, Congressional and Administrative News, 97th
Congress, 1st Session, 1981 (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co.,
1981), 95 Stat. 890-893)
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September 30, 1981, the program was administered under the
Economic Development Administration (EDA), but then it was
transferred to the Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance
(OTAA) in the International Trade Administration (ITA). 0
Services are provided by 11 regional Trade Adjustment Assis-
tance Centers (TAACs) which cover the 50 states, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands. 1 1
There are four stages in the process of trade adjustment
assistance for firms: 1) Certification; 2) Diagnostic survey';
3) Adjustment plan; and 4) Implementation, consisting of
technical and financial assistance.
1) Certification
The firm must petition the Office of Trade Adjustment
Assistance to be certified as eligible for assistance. The
local TAAC may also make recommendations to Commerce that a
firm should or should not be certified, but the final decision
is made by the Department of Commerce. Under the Trade Act of
1974, Commerce has 60 days in which to make a decision regard-
ing the firm's eligibility.12
Section 251, Title II of the Trade Act of 1974 states
that Commerce will certify a firm as eligible for TAA if it
10 Associated Research Analysis Corporation, Evaluation of the
Third Year of Operation of the Trade Adjustment Assistance
Center Program, July 1982, pp. 2-3.
1 1New England Trade Adjustment Assistance Center, Questions
and Answers About Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms,
brochure, p. 1.
1 2 Interview with Richard McLaughlin, Executive Director, New
England Trade Adjustment Assistance Center, 11/28/83.
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determines:
"(1) that a significant number or propoition of the
workers in such firm have become totally or partially
separated, or are threatened to become totally or
partially separated,
(2) that sales or production, or both, of such
firm have decreased absolutely, and
(3) that increases in imports of articles like or
directly competitive with articles produced by such
firm contributed importantly to such total or partial
separation, or threat thereof, and to such decline in
sales or production." 1 3
A firm that has recently shut down its factory or is
operating under bankruptcy proceedings can petition for
certification. 14
2) Diagnostic Survey
After the firm has been certified, most TAACs prepare a
diagnostic survey which analyzes the strengths and weaknesses
of the firm and determines its "economic viability." The New
England TAAC retains 100% control over the preparation of the
. 15
diagnostic survey.
A sample diagnostic survey supplied by the New England
TAAC reveals that this document consists of a description of
the firm, an analysis of the industry and the firm's
competitive position in that industry relative to foreign
producers. It examines such features as the firm's product
line, sales and marketing, product development, manufacturing
processes, management and financial condition.16
3U.S. Code, 93rd Congress, p. 2351.
1 4 New England TAAC, Questions and Answers, p. 3.
15 Interview with McLaughlin.
1 6 New England TAAC, Diagnostic Survey, Chairco Company.
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3) Adjustment Plan
The adjustment plan describes the firm's strategy for
recovering from the impact of imports. It is the most impor-
tant document in the whole adjustment process and must be
approved before the firm is eligible for further technical
or financial assistance. The plan must show that the firm
is aware of its strengths, weaknesses, and the problems it
faces. The firm's management should be deeply involved in
preparing the adjustment plan but they may be assisted by
the TAAC staff or outside consultants.17 The Department of
Commerce won't approve assistance unless the adjustment plan
deals with the diagnostic survey's analysis of the strengths
and weaknesses of the firm. 18 *
Section 252, Title II of the Trade Act of 1974 states
that Commerce will approve a firm's application for adjustment
assistance only if it determines that the firm's adjustment
proposal:
"(i) is reasonably calculated to contribute to the
economic adjustment of the firm,
(ii) gives adequate consideration to the interests
of the workers of such firm,
(iii) demonstrates that the firm will make all
reasonable efforts to use its own resources for
economic development."19
The first criterion means that the adjustment plan must
contain a clear strategy for capitalizing on the firm's
1 7 New England TAAC, Questions and Answers, p. 3.
1 8 Interview with McLaughlin.
19U.S. Code, 93rd Congress, pp. 2351-2352.
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strengths, tackling its weaknesses, and overcoming its problems.
Depending on the strategy, the plan should specify measures
that will be taken in areas such as management changes or
improvements, manufacturing process improvements, new product
development, cost control, marketing and sales plans, or
improving the financial structure of the firm. Finally, it
must lay out a timetable for achieving each specific objective
so the government and the firm can monitor the firm's progress.20
According to an ITA manual on how to prepare adjustment
plans, the second criterion means that the plan should state:
"How the interests of the firm's employees have been
taken into account in the development of the adjustment
plan. This may be self-evident if all or virtually all
of the employees will either maintain their employment
or be offered reemployment as a result of the plan.
Where this is not so or as a result of operations
being relocated or closed down, the plan should describe
efforts directed toward assisting employees in finding
other jobs. For example, it may include assistance
with relocation, training, employment counseling or
the like."21
Finally, the firm must pour all of its available resources
into the recovery plan and government adjustment assistance
should not displace financial resources available from the
firm. 2 2 According to Charles Smith, Deputy Director of
Certification, OTAA, his office determines this by requiring
firms to submit audited financial statements and disclose all
assets and liabilities. OTAA encourages firms to use their own
2 0 New England TAAC, Questions and Answers, p. 6.
2 1 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration,
Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance, Trade Adjustment Assistance
Guidelines for the Preparation and Submission of Adjustment Plans,
brochure, January 1982, p. 9.
2 2 New England TAAC, Questions and Answers, p. 6.
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resources, if they have any available, sometimes even asking
management to pledge their personal property as collateral
for loans. Smith said that the financial assistance division
of OTAA is "a bank of last resort for companies that can't
get the resources themselves." 2 3
4) Implementation
The firm must implement the recommendations outlined in
the adjustment plan. Implementation assistance can be provided
by the local TAAC staff, who are experienced in marketing,
finance, management, and production. Alternatively, a private
consultant can be selected through a competitive bid process.
In either case, the federal government will pay up to 75% of
the cost of services. The local TAAC also monitors the progress
of firms in meeting the goals of the recovery plan.
The TAAC can provide two general types of technical
assistance: 1) Assistance in preparing the certification
petition, diagnostic survey, adjustment plan, and loan appli-
cation; and 2) Implementation assistance, including changes in
management, production, and marketing systems, feasibility
studies, and other services.
There is no charge for initial consultations with the TAAC
regarding the program and potential eligibility. Up to three
person/days of assistance in the preparation of petitions
will be provided at no cost. However, when more than three
2 3 Interview with Charles Smith, Deputy Director of Certifica-
tion, Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance, 4/26/84.
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person/days of technical assistance are requested, the firm
or some other non-federal source must pay at least 25% of the
cost. If the government's share of all technical assistance
to be provided comes to over $75,000, then the government's
share will be increasingly reduced to less than 75%.24 The
federal share of technical assistance provided by all TAACs
over the ten years of the program's existence has averaged
$30,000 - $45,000 per firm. 2 5
Eligible firms can also apply for financial assistance.
Each firm may receive a maximum of $4 million in loans and
loan guarantees. This includes $3 million in guaranteed loans,
with the federal government guaranteeing up to 90% of the
outstanding balance of the loan made by a commercial bank or
lender. The OTAA can also make direct loans of up to
$1 million. It is OTAA policy to limit the request for
financial assistance to $3 million unless it can be demon-
strated that the adjustment plan cannot succeed without more
assistance. The Trade Act permits direct loan financing to
be considered only if a guaranteed loan cannot be developed.
It takes from four to twelve months, or longer, from the time
a firm applies for certification until it receives financial
assistance. The government has no interim financing available
while the company waits for the government to act on its
2 4 New England TAAC, Questions and Answers, pp. 7-10).
2 5 Interview with Tom Heckman, Technical Assistance Division,
Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance, 4/30/84.
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financing proposal. 2 6
For loan requests under $500,000, the New England TAAC
assists the firm in applying for Small Business Administration
loans or refers them to commercial banks or institutions like
Massachusetts Community Development Finance Corporation. 2 7
Section 254, Title II of the Trade Act of 1974 states
the uses of these loans and loan guarantees as:
"(1) for acquisition, construction, installation,
modernization, development, conversion, or expansion
of land, plant, buildings, equipment, facilities, or
machinery, or (2) to supply such working capital as
may be necessary to enable the firm to implement its
adjustment proposal." 2 8
Interest rates on direct loans are based on the average
market yield of U.S. securities of comparable maturity, plus
a charge (currently 1-.1/4%) to cover overhead and probable
losses. This usually results in rates below or near the prime
rate. The loan repayment terms vary. Direct and guaranteed
loans for fixed assets are usually made for a period no greater
than the useful life of the assets, up to a maximum of 25 years.
Working capital loans and loan guarantees are generally made
for between five and seven years, up to a maximum of 10 years.
The government's decision to approve a loan is based on the
finding: "(1) that the funds required are not available from
the firm's own resources; and (2) that there is reasonable
assurance of repayment of the loan," according to Section 255,
2 6 New England TAAC, Questions and Answers, pp. 10-15.
2 7 Interview with McLaughlin.
2 8 U.S. Code, 93rd Congress, p. 2352.
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Title II of the legislation.29 This is determined by review-
ing the firm's financial position, its marketing plans, the
quality of management, production plans, and technology. The
quality of collateral and the availability of guarantees may
also be considerations. 3 0
Current Status of the TAA Program
The future of the TAA program is uncertain under the
Reagan administration. President Reagan has attempted to cut
off all funds for trade adjustment assistance to industries,
firms, workers, and communities. The President has zero-
budgeted the program three times, only to have its funding
restored by Congress. In the fall of 1983, Congress extended
authority for the program for two more years, until September
1985. But the program was only funded through September 1984,
so OTAA officials will have to lobby for more funding for
fiscal year 1985. The TAA program for firms was funded at
$25 million in fiscal year 1984, compared to previous years'
funding levels of $27-$28 million.3 1
Demand for the program has grown at the same time as the
Reagan administration's attacks, as can be seen in Table 1.
Table 1 shows the number of firms served and types of assistance
provided under the program since 1975. There was a 112%
increase in the number of firms certified for trade adjustment
assistance from fiscal year 1982 to fiscal year 1983. As the
29
Ibid., p. 2353.
3 0 New England TAAC, Questions and Answers, pp. 10-15.
3 1 Interview with Charles Smith.
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program's funding has been cut, it has concentrated more on
providing technical rather than financial assistance to firms,
and steering clients to conventional sources of financing. 3 2
Table 2 shows the levels of financial assistance provided to
firms broken down by industry for fiscal year 1982. The
decrease in the amount of financial assistance provided
since 1979 is clear. The program has also been getting larger
businesses for clients, so the average federal share of tech-
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nical assistance has risen.
The types of industries served by the TAA program has also
changed over time. Table 3 shows number of certified firms
since 1975 broken down by industry. In the three-year period
from 1975-1977, firms in the apparel, footwear, handbag, and
textile industries--the "labor-intensive" industries con-
sidered to be the hardest-hit by imports and in severe decline--
accounted for 76% of the total number of firms assisted. In
the 1978-1980 period, these industries' share of the total
had shrunk to 54%; and by 1981-1983, 34%. The slice of the pie
made up of firms in other industries has grown over the same
period from a thin slice to 66% of the total in 1981-1983.
This slice of the pie includes a wide range of industries, but
over time it's been filled with growing numbers of firms in
"high tech" industries such as computer manufacturing, computer
peripheral equipment, cameras, photocopying equipment, and
3 2 Interview with Jack Osborne, Director of Certification
Division, Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance, 5/1/84.
3 3 Interview with Heckman.
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TABLE 1
TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE SUMMARY AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1983
FY 1980 FY 1981 FY 1982 FY 1983 FY 1984
To Date
Cumulative
To Date
Firms Certified
Petition Acceptance
to Certification
(Average number of days)
Adjustment Plans Accepted
Total Firms Receiving DOC
Direct Technical Assistance
Total Firms Assisted by
TAACs*
o Pre-Certification
o Post-Certification
o Implementation
Total Tech. Asst. ($000)
o Firms
o Industry Wide
504
45
468
58
293
54
195
54
413
57
113
60
1,986
52
( ----- Not Available ------- ) 114
161
389
302
74
13
$35,774
22,237
13.537
15
653
5'14
131
8
$17,581
10,563
7.018
0
623
337
229
57
$17,461
12,859
4.602
0
523
248
213
62
$12,163
8,695
3.468
0
734
513
157
64
$17,466
12,989
4.477
0
772
343
257
172
$1,734
1 ,336
398
176
3,694
2,257
1,061
376
$102, 179
68,679
33.500
Firms Receiving Financial
Assistance 179 67 49 12 16 3 326
Total Loans ($000) $199,903 $72,091 $49,784 $19,289 $15,784 $5,700- $362,551
o Direct Loans 117,845 42,032 27,904 2,527 7,849 2,700 200,857
o Guaranteed Loans 82,058 30,059 21,880 16,762 7,935 3,000 161,694
*Double counting is unavoidable, since most firms receive more than one major category of TAAC
assistance. Only completed projects are counted in FY 1979 through FY 1983; in-process
projects are carried over to the next year, and inactive projects are not included.
*Preliminary estimate
Source: Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department
of Commerce, 3/23/84
Before
FY 1980
TABLE 2
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED FOR
CERTIFIED FIRMS UNDER THE TRADE ACT OF 1974
BY CALENDAR YEAR
Financial Assistance
Number of Firms Industry Authorized
($000)
2 Machinery and
Equipment 6,000
1 Textiles 3,000
1 Leather 3,000
3 Apparel 1,805
1 Metal Stampings 1,000
1 Furniture and
Decorative Accessories 560
1 Handbags 500
1 Artifical Flowers 382
1 Electronic Components 240
12 TOTAL 1982 16,487
42 1981 45,904
63 1980 61,839
86 1979 104,819
67 1978 70,099
22 1977 24,267
12 1976 14,350
4 1975 3,500
308 GRAND TOTAL 341,265
Source: Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance, International
Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
(9/21/83)
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TABLE 3
FIRMS CERTIFIED ELIGIBLE TO APPLY FOR
TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE
BY INDUSTRY
Calendar Year
1975-76 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983* Total
Apparel & Accessories 7 28 47 150 146 71 69 63 581
Footwear 17 49 31 13 17 3 4 8 142
Metal Products - 1 7 13 14 17 24 39 115
Communication Equipment 2 2 4 15 25 20 7 5 80
Handbags & Parts 3 16 10 20 8 9 6 9 81
Textiles 2 2 11 12 20 13 11 7 78
Wood Products - - - 4 35 15 9 9 72
Food & Beverage 6 1 3 10 25 11 6 25 87
Machinery & Equipment - - 1 10 17 13 19 44 104
Transportation Equipment - - - 6 15 -9 9 12 51
Electronics 2 3 9 10 11 3 9 47
Giftware 1 2 1 3 16 5 9 8 45
Sporting Goods 1 - 1 11 6 5 13 7 44
Jewelry 1 2 1 8 12 2 6 10 42
Flowers & Plants - - 1 5 5 6 2 3 22
Fasteners - 1 1 7 6 3 7 25
Furniture & Parts - 1 - 1 8 2 4 1-4 30
Leather - - 1 3 5 - 1 1 11
Miscellaneous 12 4 6 35 55 37 33 33 215
Total 52 110 129 329 446 255 238 313 1,872
*January-September 1983.
Source: Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance, International Trade Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce, 9/27/83
t. 34
consumer electronics.
The New England TAAC
The New England TAAC serves the states of Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Vermont, and Maine.
It was formerly run out of the New England Regional Commission,
one of eight regional commissions authorized under the Public
Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 which were terminated
by the Reagan administration on September 30, 1981. The New
England TAAC is a private business which developed to take
over management of the TAAC program.35 The current director,
Richard McLaughlin, has a Harvard MBA and experience as a
marketing vice president and general manager for a fastener
firm. Its staff is experienced in marketing, finance, engi-
neering, and management, and includes senior business execu-
tives with 10-25 years of on-line business experience.36
The New England TAAC has assisted over 400 firms in a
wide range of industries. Table 4 shows the number of firms
assisted by NETAAC during fiscal year 1983 (October 1, 1982
to September 30, 1983) and fiscal year 1982 broken down by
industry.
Table 5 is a state-by-state breakdown of the total number
of firms assisted by NETAAC in fiscal year 1983 and the total
number of employees in those firms.
3 4 Interview with Osborne.
3 5 Associated Research Analysis Corporation, Evaluation,
pp. 29-30.
3 6 Interview with McLaughlin.
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NETAAC, like the TAA program as a whole, mainly deals with
small businesses. Its clients vary from $1 million to
$80 million in assets, with the largest concentration in
the $3 million to $10 million range.
3 Ibid.
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TABLE 4
NETAAC-ASSISTED FIRMS BY SIC CODE
(OCTOBER 1, 1982 - SEPTEMBER 30, 1983)
PRODUCT GROUP/SIC CODE_ CASES PERCENT
PERCENT
(IN 1982)
Food & Kindred Products (2000-2099)
Textile Mill Products (2200-2299)
Apparel & Other Finished Products
Made From Fibers & Similar
Materials (2300-2399)
Lumber & Wood Products
Except Furniture (2400-2499)
Furniture & Fixtures (2500-2599)
Rubber & Misc. Plastic Products
(3000-3099)
Leather & Leather Products (3100-3199)
Asbestos (3200-3299)
Primary Metals Industries (3300-3399)
Fabricated Metal Products, Except
Machinery & Transportation
Equipment (3400-3499)
Machinery, Except Electrical (3500-3599)
Electrical & Electronic Machinery
& Supplies (3600-3699)
Measuring Instruments; Photographics;
Medical & Optical Goods; Clocks
(3800-3899)
Misc. Manufacturing Industries
(Jewelry, Silverware & Novelty Items)
(3900-3999)
Other (5119-5147)
1
8
.88
7.08
15 13.27
6
3
6
10
1
3
5.31
2.65
5.31
8.85
.88
2.65
17 15.04
14 12.39
9
7
8.00
6.19
12 10.62
1
Total Cases
.88
113' 100.00
*Some Significant Shifts in Caseload by Industry
Source: New England Trade Adjustment Assistance Center, 12/83
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13.4*
16.8*
5.0
.8*
3.4
11.9*
0
3.4
10.1*
2.5*
10.9
6.7
10.0
3.4
84.1
TABLE 5
NETAAC-ASSISTED FIRMS
(OCTOBER 1, 1982 - SEPTEMBER 30, 1983)
CONNECTICUT
Employees:
Firms:
400
4
MAINE
Employees:
Firms:
2,526
9
MASSACHUSETTS
Employees:
Firms:
7,453
71
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Employees: 1,307
Firms: 10
RHODE ISLAND
Employees:
Firms:
1,472
13
VERMONT
Employees:
Firms:
TOTAL NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES:
TOTAL NUMBER OF FIRMS:
368
6
13,526
113
Source: New England Trade Adjustment Assistance Center, 12/83
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Chapter 2. J&L Precision Bearings
J&L Precision Bearings, a manufacturer of miniature
precision ball bearings, has a plant in Shopsbury,
Massachusetts and is a subsidiary of General Bearing of
Upper Falls, New York. The firm shut down in 1980. It was
certified for TAA in March 1982 and has received financial
and technical assistance to modernize its plant and equip-
ment. The plant will be relocated to New York state after
it is retooled.38
Industry Analysis
Ball and roller bearings are an invisible but essential
part of an industrial economy that make its machinery turn.
They are used to reduce friction in everything from automobiles
and farm equipment to personal computers, and are considered
a strategic component for defense production. Because bear-
ings are such an integral part of the economy, the industry's
prosperity depends on the performance of the economy.
The industry can be roughly divided into two markets:
large, heavy-duty bearings used in industries like auto and
steel, and miniature precision bearings, defined as bearings
with an outside diameter of less than 3/8" or 30mm.
3 8 This case study is based on interviews with Arnold
Cunningham, Operations Maganer, J&L Precision Bearings, 3/19/84
and 4/25/84, and John Nevin, Comptroller and Vice President,
General Bearing, 3/22/84 and 4/27/84. The names of persons,
firms, and cities have been changed to protect the confiden-
tiality of the firm. The names of states are real. Unless
otherwise cited, the information in this case study comes
from these interviews.
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Mini precision bearings are actually a very sophisticated
"high tech" product built to high design and engineering stan-
dards.39 They are also used in "high tech" applications, such
as computer periphery equipment and automatic bank teller
machines. For example, they make bank check processing machines
run smoother so the checks don't get mutilated. The bearings
have defense applications such as guidance systems and instru-
mentation. In fact, mini precision bearings are considered
one of the 17 strategic components by the U.S. Department of
Defense. There is a federal law that the bearings must be
domestically produced, so the United States is not dependent
on foreign suppliers in case of war.
The mini precision bearing industry is highly competitive.
The leading U.S. producers are: New Hampshire Ball Bearing;
Barden in Connecticut; Miniature Precision Bearing in New
Hampshire; and a division of the Japanese firm, Nippon Precision
Bearing, which built a plant in Chatsworth, California after
the defense law was passed.
Taking the ball and roller bearing industry as a whole,
the U.S. Department of Commerce reports that 1983 shipments
3 9 Daniel Nossiter, "Not the Same Old Grind: Bearings Makers
Ready to Roll Across the Board," Barron's, 6/20/83, pp. 15 and 33.
4 0 Both Nevin and Cunningham referred to this law but could not
identify it. They both said that the law was one of the
reasons why the J&L plant had to be saved. I've been unable
to positively identify this law, but it could be part of the
Defense Production Act of 1950, which requires manufacturers
of strategic components to set aside reserves to assure
defense contractors of a stable supply when needed for defense
production. Cited in Jacques Gansler, The Defense Industry
(Cambridge, MA and London, England: The MIT Press, 1980), p. 67.
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decreased about 8% from 1982 levels, reflecting declines in
such major markets as steel, farm and construction equipment,
oil field equipment, machine tools, aircraft, and railroad
equipment. Improvements in the automotic market in 1983
(which represents about 30% of total sales) prevented a further
decline in sales. Total 1983 employment in the industry
dropped 9% from 1982 levels to 40,500 workers.
The industry faces significant foreign competition. The
ratio of imports to new supply (the sum of product shipments
plus imports) fell to about 12.3% in 1983, down from 14% in
1982. Japan is the leading importer. Other major importing
countries are West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Canada.
The Department of Commerce projects that the future out-
look for the industry depends on recovery in other sectors
of the U.S. economy and productivity improvements within the
industry. In 1984, industry shipments of ball and roller bear-
ings are expected to increase about 9%. Differences in quality
have not been a significant factor in the U.S. competitive
position in recent years. However, manufacturers worldwide
can produce bearings to the same dimension and tolerance
standards as U.S. firms, and imports are expected to compete
strongly in U.S. markets, especially in the small to medium-
sized bearing segments. Commerce concludes that "if U.S.
bearing manufacturers expect to remain profitable and continue
to compete in the world market, they must increase productivity
by major capital investment in new modern machinery." 41
4 1 U.S. Department of Commerce, "Ball and Roller Bearings," U.S.
Industrial Outlook 1984 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1984), pp. 24-4 - 24-6.
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Some U.S. producers are offering "just-in-time" delivery
programs, which save their customers on inventory carrying
costs, as a competitive strategy. Some manufacturers of
mini precision bearings are also banking on the development
of new computer-assisted machine tools which will increase
the efficiency of their operations and open up new markets
for their product. 4 2
History of the Firm
J&L Precision Bearings is 25 years old. It was a
privately-held company until it was acquired by General
Bearing in 1981. No production is taking place at the
Shopsbury plant while it's being retooled, but when it does
start up, J&L will produce bearings up to 30mm in size and
with a bore of 1/8" to 1/4".
J&L was mismanaged or underfinanced for most of its
25-year history, according to Cunningham. Cunningham, a
former employee of New Hampshire Ball Bearing, and another
employee of the same firm worked at J&L from 1979 to 1980.
When he came to J&L, the machinery was in bad need of repair.
Existing repairs were of the "paper clips and rubber bands"
type. The management had assured him when he came on that
the company had enough cash to operate, but it didn't.
According to John Nevin, Comptroller and Vice President of
General Bearing, J&L had lost money in the last 4-5 years
of operation. When it closed, J&L had been losing $100,000
42 Nossiter, "Not the Same Old Grind," p. 33.
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per year on the plant.
Cunningham began working on repairs in 1-979, and the firm
improved slightly. Within the first month of operations after
he arrived, the plant went from a money-losing to a profitable
position. On the first day he started working on the plant
it turned out only 3,000-4,000 units/day. By the time it
closed, it was turning out 10,000 units/day.
But this increase in production was not enough to save
J&L. The firm received a one-two blow from the recession
and foreign competition. The management had survived by
spreading the firm's debt around to its vendors, but this
tactic failed when the national economy dropped off in 1980.
Bearings were in short supply before the recession and J&L's
competitive strength had been that it could deliver ball
bearings within very short time periods. For example, it
could deliver 5,000-6,000 bearings in a period of 4-6 weeks.
This meant that the firm was able to get a premium price for
its product. When the recession hit, the larger companies had
more supply and moved in on J&L's market. Foreign competition
also reduced J&L's selling price to the point where its pro-
duction costs were greater than the price of the finished
product. The firm was especially hard hit by Japanese compe-
tition. Cunningham thinks there was some dumping by European
firms, since European bearings were selling for $.39-$.40
which J&L had to sell for $1.10-$1.15.
J&L ceased manufacturing in December 1980. Over 100
employees in the workforce were let go.
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In September 1981, General Bearing acquired the corporate
structure of J&L. J&L was involved in Chapter 11 proceedings
at the time. General Bearing is a 15-year-old privately-held
company headquartered in Upper Falls, New York. [Nevin would
not disclose General Bearing's annual sales or number of
employees.] The company makes bearings of 3" outside diameter
or less and premium radial ball bearings. It serves the manu-
facturer's market, building bearings to customer specifications.
General Bearing purchased J&L because of the quality of
its product, the small size of the firm, and a desire to
broaden General Bearing's product line. According to Nevin,
only nine firms in the world are capable of producing as high
quality mini precision bearings as J&L. The bearings have a
10,000 of an inch tolerance measurement and can spin at half
a million revolutions per minute or more. General Bearing was
also attracted to J&L because of its small size. General
Bearing wanted a small company because it wanted to control
its operations as tightly as possible. J&L was also much
cheaper than acquiring, say, an automobile bearing plant,
which would cost $40-$60 million. General Bearing already had
a business relationship with J&L, as its vice president for
manufacturing worked for J&L in the late 1960's to early 1970's.
Assistance Received by the TAA Program
In December 1981, General Bearing talked to the New York
State TAAC in Binghampton. The New York State Small Business
Administration had referred the company to the TAA program.
Before applying for TAA, General Bearing sent its accounting
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staff to check out J&L's plant to make sure it was economically
viable. The pre-diagnostic survey was combined with the
certification process. J&L was certified in March 1982.
Nevin described the main problems with the firm as re-
vealed in the diagnostic survey: 1) Most importantly, the
manufacturing operation was too small to compete in today's
market. It did production runs of 3,000-4,000 bearings.
According to Nevin, a firm can't produce such a small batch
and remain competitive in today's market. Bearing manufacturers
have to spread their overhead over runs of 10,000 bearings to
be profitable; 2) The production unit was too small and
disorganized, resulting in bottlenecks in the production process.
An analogy for the types of production problems J&L ran into
would be an auto plant that produces two frames but only one
body; 3) The production technology was "somewhat antiquated";
4) Management wasn't informed about or didn't have the money
to finance new production techniques; 5) Because of the firm's
continual operating deficit, it couldn't afford to make a
formal marketing plan. J&L did not target its marketing and
sales, and catered to whoever needed its product at the time.
General Bearing prepared a business plan for J&L, and
this was converted into the adjustment plan with the assistance
of the New York State TAAC. After a competitive bid process
involving 4-5 consultants, Cunningham and his associate were
contracted by the New York State TAAC to provide technical
assistance to J&L. They were hired in June 1983 to do what
Nevin termed "pre-production planning"--setting up standard
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operating procedures, investigating manufacturing techniques,
and making recommendations. It took a little over one year
from the time of certification to receipt of technical assis-
tance. Under the assistance plan from the New York State
TAAC, General Bearing has also been going through the
organizational and business plans for J&L.
The RFP for consultant work requested quotes for the
following tasks: a quality control manual; machine rebuilding
and maintenance; set-up trouble-shooting; physical lay-out
plans; cycle times for the production process; production
control; engineering drawing control; tooling; and rebuilding
equipment.
Cunningham and the other consultants have made signifi-
cant progress in retooling the plant. So far they have updated
all tooling, checked out the machines for OEM specifications,
repaired leaks in the hydraulic system, aligned the machinery,
and replaced the plant's old heat treating facility. They
checked the balance of the plant, making sure that if there
are five machines for one operation then there are also five
machines for complementary operations. They also changed the
motor generator in the plant so production workers don't have
to shut down six machines in order to change the speed of the
spindle.
There were originally many manual operations in the plant,
which they have automated. For example, they designed auto-
matic loading machines and automatic guaging machines.
Cunningham and his associate contracted to do a part of
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this work and they hired other consultants for the automation
and other tasks.
General Bearing will also receive financial assistance
from the TAA program, but Nevin would not disclose the amount.
It will go into future operations and will finance fixed assets
and working capital. It would have taken about two years to
receive financial assistance after certification.
Impacts of Assistance
The Shopsbury plant will be shut down after retooling and
General Bearing plans to build a new plant in the Upper Falls,
New York metropolitan area. The plant will be located at a
high-technology industrial park associated with a technology-
oriented university in the area. Construction begins in
April 1984 and General Bearing plans to begin operations in
late September to early October of 1984. Nothing will be left
at the Shopsbury plant.
When asked why General Bearing was relocating the plant,
Nevin responded that "The operation as it exists in Shopsbury
is obsolete. It's antiquated. It can't be brought up to
date. It's expensive, old, and dirty." He added, "There's
absolutely no way that we could cost-justify the Shopsbury
plant." He also said that the Shopsbury plant is two-story,
which presents problems because the structure vibrates too
much for high-precision machining. Their new plant will be
one-story. High taxes and construction costs in Massachusetts
also entered into his firm's decision. He stated that industrial
land costs $110,000-$120,000/acre in Shopsbury, versus only
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$30,000/acre in the new location. This is a consideration
because the new facility is on a 7 acre site and is costing
the company $1 million. General Bearing also decided to move
the plant closer to its headquarters "to consolidate our
operations," Nevin said. He said that they'd considered
several areas: the metropolitan area around Shopsbury, a site
in North Carolina, and a site in Marriot, Massachusetts.
His company chose the Upper Falls metro area because "It
provides many of the big city advantages without the detri-
ments," he said. By detriments, he meant "urban decay" and
long commute times because of traffic congestion. He noted
that the new location is beautiful, and that employees can
be out in the country in only 15 minutes.
A letter from the high-tech park where General Bearing
is moving the plant states (in reference to General Bearing
and two other new tenants): "Please note that all three of
these companies were located in other high-tech areas of the
country and chose Technology Park as the site which
offered them the best possible opportunities." 4 3
Cunningham feels that the new plant will meet the
competition, not on a large scale, but in terms of the market
share they want. In the beginning of operations, the firm
will be a few pennies off from its competitors because its
customers will start out purchasing in small quantities. For
example, if New Hampshire Ball Bearing can sell an R-4 bearing
for $.51, General Bearing will initially sell the same product
4 3 Letter from Anne Kerwin, Administrative Assistant,
Technology Park, 4/17/84.
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for $.53-$.54. Cunningham's three-year plan calls for General
Bearing capturing 5% of the market share in its first three
years of operation. One product the new plant will produce is
"rotary components"--pre-packaged bearings ready for installa-
tion in the machine by the user. This product will give the
company a competitive edge because the majority of damage to
bearings comes from mishandling.
When asked if the new plant would be competitive, Nevin
responded "absolutely." The company will not only meet but
beat the competition in some areas by specializing in market
niches. General Bearing's market niche is based on batch
size and speed of product delivery. It produces for manu-
facturers who need less than 10,000-20,000 bearings a year.
The requirements of these manufacturers are too big for the
local job shops but too small for the bid producers. General
Bearing's inventory services also mean it can deliver its
products fast. The industry average for inventory turnover is
four times a year, but General Bearing turns over its inventory
less than twice a year. "We're the last stopgap before you
go to the distributors," Nevin said. General Bearing can
offer diverse quantities and qualities of bearings as fast as
a distributor but at manufacturer's prices. This is a competi-
tive advantage because manufacturers have to wait 8-9 months
to get bearings from other suppliers, and a company is in
trouble if it miscalculates its needs.
The new plant will have 55 employees by the first year.
General Bearing will add a second shift early in the second
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year and by the end of the year, the company plans to have
100-125 employees. By the third year, it projects 150 employees.
Nevin said that many of the former employees of the
Shopsbury plant were absorbed into the local workforce.
Seven of them are presently working at J&L rebuilding the
plant. Cunningham is attempting to locate and call back all
skilled employees of the Shopsbury plant. It's anticipated
that 10-12 set-up and master set-up persons from the old
plant will be hired at the new Upper Falls plant, if the
firm can locate them. This rehiring of former employees is
not due to any contractual obligation from the TAA program,
Cunningham said, but rather to the need for skilled workers.
It takes a lot of training to become a good bearing maker
and if the company can pick up people who already have the
skills, this will make training new plant employees easier
for Cunningham.
General Bearing will rely on the New York labor force
for the balance of its employment needs. General Bearing
has worked out an agreement with the New York State TAAC to
give preferential treatment in hiring to trade-impacted
employees in the metropolitan area surrounding Upper Falls.
This region is a trade-impacted area, and most of the trade-
impacted workers are women in the clothing industry. Nevin
said that General Bearing prefers to train its own employees
and that there will be training since the industry requires
highly skilled labor.
[The J&L plant was not unionized when it shut down, so I
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could not contact a union to get their side of the story.
Cunningham said that there was a union "a long time ago"
(before he got there), but he didn't know what union.]
Management's Evaluation of the TAA Program
When asked to evaluate the TAA program, Cunningham re-
stated the question in terms of whether the New York State
TAAC was instrumental in allowing General Bearing enough time
to shut down and upgrade the plant. He thought that General
Bearing made a good decision to take the time to reorganize
the firm, rather than starting up operations with the old,
inefficient plant and equipment. He guessed that it is
costing General Bearing $ 3 5 ,000-$50,000/month to keep the
plant shut down, including rent and salary for the consultants
and toolmakers.
Nevin stated that General Bearing could have done this
reorganization on its own, without assistance from the TAA
program. But he said the benefits of the TAA program are that
"It assists you in changing the types of lending to fund these
projects." It means that firms can get loans with a longer
amortization period. "It has a very positive effect on a
company's capital position," he said. He said there were
benefits to having the government stand behind his company
when going to bankers. But he also said that some people
would disagree with this assessment and would call the program
a "'pain in the ass."
Nevin said that he got along with the TAAC staff. He
rated the quality of their services as better than the local
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bank but no comparison to sophisticated Wall Street financiers.
He rated the consultants as "excellent across the board."
His major complaint was that the program is "massively
time consuming." As he put it, "For companies that are about
to go over the edge, by the time these folks can act, they
would go over the edge."
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Chapter 3. Abbott Machine Company
Abbott Machine Company is a manufacturer of textile
machinery based in New Hampshire. The company suffered
dramatic decreases in market share and employment from the
1950's to the 1980's as imports penetrated its market. Abbott
received technical and financial assistance from the New
England TAAC over a three-year period to develop a new
state-of-the-art textile winding machine. 4 4
Industry Analysis
The U.S. textile machinery industry has experienced a
deep decline in its share of both the domestic and international
market since the 1960's. Between 1960 and 1970, the U.S. share
of the domestic textile machinery market dropped from 93% to
67%. In the same period, U.S. share of the international
market slipped from 16% to 10%.45 Employment in the U.S.
industry has dropped steadily from about 26,000 in 1977 to
less than 17,000 workers in 1983.46
4 4 This case study is based on interviews with Derrick Smith,
President, Abbott Machine Company, 3//22/84, and Kathi Smith,
co-owner of Abbott, 4/30/84, and "Abbott Machine Moves Ahead
With Winder," New Hampshire Business Review, 9/82, p. 11.
Unless otherwise cited, the information in this case study
comes from these sources.
4 5 U.S. Department of Commerce and Data Resources, Inc. Cited
in American Textile Machinery Association/Economic Development
Administration, Opportunities and Strategies for U.S. Textile
Machinery Manufacturers to Improve Their Competitive Positions
in Domestic and Foreign Textile Markets - 1980-1985, May 1981,
p. 12.
U.S. Department of Commerce, "Textile Machinery," U.S.
Industrial Outlook 1984 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1984), p. 23-11.
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The domestic share of the market controlled by U.S.
manufacturers of textile machinery has been reduced by
movement of the textile industry overseas and imports.
Between 1967 and 1981, imports as a percentage of total
textile machinery purchased by U.S. textile firms grew from
19% to 42%. This import competition has not come from low-
wage countries.47 In 1983, the major foreign suppliers were:
West Germany, 36% of imports; Switzerland, 26%; Japan, 15%;
Italy, 6%; and France and the United Kingdom, 4% each. 4 8
The textile industry has shifted increasingly to the
developing countries, but the fragmented structure of the
U.S. textile machinery industry places it at a competitive
disadvantage for capturing these growing markets. Third World
countries with booming textile industries are interested in
purchasing "turn-key plants" which come with all the machinery
necessary to begin production. Fragmentation of the U.S.
industry means that individaul companies tend to specialize
in the production of only one type of equipment.49 Until
1983, not one U.S. manufacturer could supply a complete yarn
mill.50 Western European producers, in contrast, are able to
supply a wide range of equipment, either individually or in
marketing consortiums with other companies. In some cases,
4 7 Beth Siegel, 1984 draft report on the specialty machinery
industry in Massachusetts written for the Massachusetts
Governors Commission on the Future of Mature Industries, p. 3.
4 8 U.S. Department of Commerce, "Textile Machinery," p. 23-11.
4 9 Siegel, draft, pp. 3 and 5.
5 0 U.S. Department of Commerce, "Textile Machinery," p. 23-11.
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Western European governments assist their domestic producers
in packaging turn-key facilities for export.51 The govern-
ments of Western Europe and Japan also assist exports by
offering financing, loan guarantees, insurance, and research
and development support to their textile machinery industries. 5 2
U.S. exports were only 20-30% of total output between 1972
and 1983. In contrast, Western European manufacturers export
at least 95% of their total output. 5 3
The main cause for the decline of the U.S. textile machinery
industry has been its lack of technological innovation relative
to foreign manufacturers, according to many industry analysts.
This criticism of the U.S. textile industry extends as far
back as the 1940's, when the May 1944 issue of Fortune Magazine
criticized the industry for being more interested in the more
profitable repair, parts, and accessories aspects of the
business than investing in developing technologically com-
petitive products.54
The U.S. Department of Commerce projects that 1984 ship-
ments (exports plus domestic sales) of textile machinery will
rise only about 5% over 1983 levels. This figure assumes in-
creased demand for yarn and warp preparation equipment, a
market niche where U.S. producers maintain technological
5 1 Siegel, draft, pp. 5-6.
5 2 American Textile Machinery Association, Toward Equity in
International Trade, December 1981, pp. 26-51.
5 3 Siegel, draft, p. 3.
5 4 Ibid., p. 4.
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parity with their overseas competitors. 5 5
The future of the U.S. textile machinery industry, ac-
cording to Commerce and other analysts, depends on three
factors: 1) Expanding R&D programs to design new equipment
that is technologically competitive with imports; 2) Develop-
ing cooperative marketing strategies; and 3) The exchange rate.
The relative strength of the U.S. dollar has placed U.S.
manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage in both the
domestic and global markets. The Department of Commerce predicts
that the industry will remain based in the industrially
advanced nations because of the high levels of technological
innovation required for the new generations of equipment,
such as computer-controlled monitoring of production equip-
ment and robotics. 5 6
History of the Firm
Abbott Machine Company is a 54-year old manufacturer of
yarn winding machines (which transfer yarn from little packages
onto big packages) based in Wilton, New Hampshire. Abbott
also has a manufacturing facility in Greenville, Sauth
Carolina. The firm introduced the first automatic knotting
machine (which automatically ties knots between different
yarns, so as to reduce labor requirements) to the textile
U.S. Department of Commerce, "Textile Machinery," p. 23-12.
Yarn and warp preparation equipment prevents the yarn from
breaking during the weaving process, when the fibers are
subjected to high stress levels. Explained in Ann Collier,
A Handbook of Textiles, 2nd ed. (Oxford, New York, Toronto,
Sydney: Pergamon Press, 1974), pp. 98-99.
5 6 U.S. Department of Commerce, "Textile Machinery," pp.
23-11 - 23-12 and Siegel, draft, p. 8.
52
industry in the late 1940's and has supplied equipment to
major textile manufacturers like J.P. Stevens and Burlington
Mills. Abbott is one of only two major winding machine
manufacturers left in the United States.
Derrick Smith, President of Abbott Machine, and his wife
Kathi Smith purchased Abbott in 1978. By this time, Abbott's
market share and employment levels had dropped significantly,
as imports moved in on the market for textile machinery.
Abbott's share of the market plunged from a peak of 25-30%
in the 1955-1960's period to only 3% in the 1970's and '80's.
And this 3% is a highly specialized market share. In the
past, Abbott manufactured textile winding machinery for
cotton yarns, but the technology for winding these finer
counts of yarns (for example, shirting) "got ahead of. Abbott,"
according to Kathi Smith, co-owner of Abbott. Abbott's
machines were still competitive for the heavier yarns, like
carpet yarns, so the firm was forced to specialize in the
manufacture of equipment for carpet yarns. Employment dropped
from the 1955 peak of 350 workers to today's level of 100
workers. The largest drop in employment occurred in the late
1960's. Currently the firm does $3 million in annual sales.
The firm's financial records were too disorganized when the
Smiths purchased the company for them to figure out past
sales levels.
According to Derrick Smith, import competition has come
from German, Italian, and more recently, Japanese manufacturers.
Abbott's market share shrank drastically in the 1960's when
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European manufacturers began to penetrate the U.S. market with
more costly but more automated and technologically advanced
machines. By the time the Smiths purchased Abbott, the firm's
sales consisted primarily of replacement parts for Abbott
winders--a market that was bound to shrink as more U.S.
textile mills switched over to European products.
When the Smiths purchased Abbott in 1978, they realized
that the company's future depended on developing and marketing
a winding machine that would be fully competitive with foreign
products. Abbott engineers began designing a cone winding
machine that would offer the features needed by textile
manufacturers--high speed winding, fast retie of breaks in
the yarn, and electronic yarn controls.
Assistance Received by the TAA Program
The Smiths contacted the New England TAAC in 1979 for help
in developing and financing the project. Derrick Smith heard
about the program through an advertisement the New Hampshire
state economic development office had sent to all small
businesses in the state.
The diagnostic survey prepared by the NETAAC revealed
the following problems with Abbott: 1) Abbott suffered from
declining market share. It had become an aging parts business
serving its old customers. The percentage of orders that
went for new equipment had dropped from 80% to 20%; 2) it
suffered from declining employment because Abbott had not
made technological advances to keep up with the competition;
and 3) its recovery hinged on developing a new winding machine.
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Abbott received $233,000 in technical assistance from the
NETAAC. Derrick Smith said that his firm did most of the R&D
work on the new machine, but it subcontracted some of the
engineering work. After a competitive bidding process in-
volving three firms, NETAAC hired an engineering and product
development consulting firm, Butler Service Group, Inc., of
Plaistow, New Hampshire in 1980 for assistance in engineering
and testing the new machine. Butler was chosen because of
the firm's specialized skills in electronics, noise levels,
and dust control. It took six months from time of certification
to receipt of technical assistance.
Abbott also received a $1 million federal loan for working
capital and financing the development of the machine.
The final product of the three years of R&D work performed
by Abbott, NETAAC, and the consultants is the Model 81 winder,
a state-of-the-art "high tech" textile winding machine. The
Model 81 features winding speeds up to 2,000 yards per minute
(compared to an earlier generation of Abbott equipment, the
DB10, with a winding speed of 1,200 yards per minute); fast
retie cycle (10.8 seconds); electronic yarn cleaner and knot
monitor; and a microprocessor to assure that doffing, retieing,
and bobbin changing actions are interlocked and performed
smoothly and to provide counting information. In addition,
the machine can handle all standard cheese and cones, and
each winding unit has its own knotter. 5 7
5 7 Abbott Machine Company, Abbott Machine Model 81 Winder,
brochure.
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The new machine was ready to go. Abbott installed the
first machine in the premises of one of its customers in
1982. The company showed a prototype of the machine at the
American Textile Machinery Exhibition in Greenville, South
Carolina, in the fall of 1982.
Impacts of Assistance
Then, what could have been a successful turnaround of a
troubled company was set back by the strong U.S. dollar.
Derrick Smith reported that his firm had developed the machine
within certain parameters for production costs and selling
price. After Abbott introduced its product onto the market
in September 1983, the strong dollar affected the exchange
rate so much that the Italian firm of Savio could offer a
similar product for $400/spindle and $20,000/machine cheaper
than Abbott could produce it. Savio also enjoys a competitive
advantage because it is financed by the Italian government.
Derrick Smith says Abbott is just "sitting in limbo,"
waiting for the U.S. dollar to weaken. He says the dollar
was the only factor that prevented Abbott's success.
"We had a better machine than anyone else."
Sales of the Model 81 winder are on hold. Abbott re-
purchased the machine it had installed with the customer
because, as Derrick Smith said, in his business manufacturers
have to supply parts to customers and it seemed "ridiculous"
to supply parts to just one customer. Abbott installed one
machine for a mill test, and "It worked out quite well,"
Kathi Smith said. The New Hampshire plant is currently
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producing replacement parts for and manufacturing its old
machines, which still have some uses.
Derrick Smith believes that if the dollar stabilizes
and Abbott does its marketing right, then the company can
regain its old 20-25% share of the market. He believes that
if the firm had been successful, its employment probably would
have tripled. He had looked for additional factory space
down south in anticipation of growth and found the Greenville
location.
[Abbott is not unionized, so I was unable to confirm
Smith's story on employment impacts of TAA with the workers.]
Management's Evaluation of the TAA Program
Derrick Smith feels that Abbott would still be in business
if it hadn't received TAA, but "in a very different way," he
said. [Producing old machines and replacement parts for a
declining market, as it is currently doing, but with no
prospects for growth.]
When asked whether Abbott could have developed the Model
81 winder without the TAA technical and financial assistance,
Kathi Smith responded, "We had no means to finance the project.
I don't believe so." She added that Abbott did not have the
engineering capabilities needed to develop the new product.
Derrick Smith is a great believer in the TAA program,
"if there is a viable product." He rated it as an "excellent"
program. "The only bad thing in the whole thing was the rate
of exchange." He couldn't think of any improvements to be
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made in the program.
He evaluated the NETAAC staff and consultants as very
good. His only minor complaint was that many of the NETAAC
staff were "political" and were hard to reach when elections
were coming up because they worked on campaigns.
He believes that the government should provide assistance
to private firms, "if they're going to stimulate free trade,
which they are." Since the government gives massive subsidies
to big corporations- like Lockheed, it should also provide
support to small businesses.
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Chapter 4. Anson, Inc.
Anson, Inc. is a Providence, Rhode Island jewelry
manufacturer specializing in the production of men's costume
jewelry. In the late 1970's to early 1980's Anson, like many
other jewelry firms in Rhode Island, was badly hit by import
competition. The company, also troubled by a history of poor
management, was forced into Chapter 11 in 1982. New manage-
ment, assisted by a $3 million loan guarantee and technical
assistance from the New England TAAC, has reorganized Anson
into a growing, successful company. The TAA package was the
object of intense political lobbying in the state, and Anson's
turnaround received considerable coverage in the Rhode Island
media. 58
Industry Analysis
The jewelry industry plays an important role in the
Rhode Island economy.59 The recession of the late 1970's pro-
duced a major shakeout of the industry, and many Rhode Island
companies failed. In 1981, jobs in the jewelry industry made
up 17.9% of total manufacturing employment in the state, down
from the 1978 peak of 22.9%. Between 1978 and 1981, employment
in the Rhode Island jewelry industry dropped from 30,900 to
5 8 This case study is based on an interview with Joseph Carpinteri,
Chief Executive Officer, Anson, 4/2/84 and Gwynne Morgan,
"New Ownership, Federal Loan Buoying Anson," The Providence
Sunday Journal, 11/13/83, Section F. Unless otherwise cited,
the information in this case study comes from these sources.
5 9 This analysis of the Rhode Island jewelry industry is
summarized from Rhode Island Strategic Development Commission,
The Greenhouse Compact: Cultivating Rhode Island's Fourth
Economy, 1983, Vol. 1, pp. 199-228.
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22,800. These figures include employment in all areas of the
jewelry industry--costume jewelry, precious metals, findings,
and specialty products.
Rhode Island also plays a major role in the national
jewelry industry, especially in certain market segments. In
1981, Rhode Island had 29% of total jewelry employment in the
U.S., and 46.9% of the costume jewelry employment.
Costume jewelry is the largest segment of the Rhode
Island jewelry industry, accounting for 48% of total jewelry
employment in the state in 1981. Women's jewelry is the largest
component of this segment in Rhode Island, but also included
are men's jewelry, novelties, and seasonal ornaments. The
key characteristics of the costume jewelry industry are that
it is seasonally cyclical and dependent on rapidly changing
fashion trends.
The Rhode Island and national jewelry industries have been
hard hit by European and Asian imports. In 1983, 21% of the
costume jewelry sold in the U.S. came from abroad, mainly
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea; 25% of the precious jewelry was
imported, mostly from Italy, according to 'the Manufacturing
Jewelers and Silversmiths of America. 6 0
Lower end costume jewelry (inexpensive earrings, for
example) is generally a low-skilled, low-wage industry in-
volving lots of assembly work. Higher-end jewelry production
(for the high-fashion market), in contrast, employs a much
60Don Lessem, "Coping With Foreign Competition," Ocean State
Business, 11/83, p. 21.
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higher proportion of skilled laborers for design, tooling,
and fabrication.
Low-end costume jewelry is especially vulnerable to
low-wage foreign competition because its production process
is characterized by low design requirements and high-volume,
long assembly runs. It is harder for low-wage foreign countries
to copy high-fashion American jewelry items when fashions
change so rapidly and the production process for high-end
jewelry is typified by short, small-volume runs, and a high
skilled labor content.
A recent analysis of the Rhode Island jewelry industry
projected that employment will decline due to market stagnation
and increasing imports from low-wage countries. Rhode Island
firms that do survive will specialize in the higher-end
lines, where they have the competitive edge of lead times,
design content, toolmaking requirements, and quality. Another
competitive strategy for Rhode Island firms is the provision
of "services" to buy the loyalty of their direct retail
customers. This means that jewelry firms provide services
formerly done by the retail store's own employees, such as
displays, restocking, inventory control, recordkeeping, and
even guaranteed sales.
History of the Firm
Anson is one of the oldest jewelry manufacturers in
the U.S. It was at one time considered a leader in the
jewelry industry. The company was founded in 1939 by Olof
Anderson, a tool maker who built the present plant at Cranston
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Industrial Park in the Providence metropolitan area about
20 years ago. The plant covers 4 acres under one roof and
is the largest men's jewelry manufacturing facility in the
country, according to Joseph Carpinteri, Chief Executive
Officer of Anson.
At present, Anson has about 350 employees and does annual
sales of $15 million. Anson has seven divisions: 1) Men's
jewelry, the largest division; 2) writing instruments;
3) Merchandising, made up of showrooms and mass merchandising;
4) Multi-media. An example would be Christmas bells sold by
American Express and advertised in "junk mail"; 5) industrial
division. For example, this division makes 5-year pins for
employees of companies like General Electric and Westinghouse;
6) box division. Anson makes all its own boxes for its use,
as well as boxes for high-select customers like the Franklin
Mint, and for precision instruments and high-quality personal
computer boards; 7) contract. This is mainly men's jewelry
on bid from the military, such as collar bars and tie tacks.
Carpinteri blamed Anson's decline on the management
practices of Anderson, in addition to intense import compe-
tition and the recession. Anderson ran the shop singlehandedly
with no delegation of authority to middle management. The
company refused to sell directly to major retail chains,
insisting instead on its historical practice of selling
through wholesalers. The company had run 90 to 120 days
late in paying its bills for years before its Chapter 11
petition. The final blow came when Hospital Trust National
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Bank refused, after 40 years, to advance any more credit to
the firm. On September 3, 1982, Anson was forced into
bankruptcy.
Carpinteri, a packaging wholesaler with real estate
experience, contacted Anson in the second week of September.
What he found was a company in very bad shape. Imports had hit
every item of jewelry Anson made, from the low to high end.
Import competition wasn't a quality problem, but rather due
to labor cost differences, Carpinteri stated. Asian manu-
facturers would violate trademarks and copy American products,
then look for a merchandiser in the U.S. Anson's sales had
declined from $20 million in 1980 to $11.5 million in 1982.
The workforce had been slashed from a high of 600 to 187
employees, and they'd been forced to take a 20% cut in pay.
Anson owed between $2.5-$3 million to trade creditors and
over $2 million to Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank.
The firm had no internal controls. For example, in the men's
jewelry line alone there were over 1,500 different styles, or
stockkeeping units (SKUs).
Carpinteri was confident that with good management and
controls, smokestack industries like Anson could be saved.
He said that Anson would never be a "glamorous high-growth,
high-tech" industry, but it could be a "bread and butter"
company.
Carpinteri began structuring a deal to purchase Anson.
His ownership of Anson was confirmed by the federal bankruptcy
court on May 11, 1983. He and some other investors bought
81.5% of Anson for $1.25 million, with the remaining share of
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stock held by Anderson's family.
Assistance Received by the TAA Program
Carpinteri worked on reviving the company, with the
assistance of the New England TAAC. He contacted the NETAAC
in the fall of 1982. He'd always known about the program
from working in the Boston area. Anson was the first firm
in Rhode Island to apply for TAA.
NETAAC staff came down to Providence to look at the plant,
and their diagnostic survey showed that management and lack
of controls were the main problems with the firm. There
was no middle management. Since all the inventory and sales
figures had been performed manually, the firm didn't know,
of thousands of items that were going out of the plant, which
items were making and which were losing money. They hadn't
costed anything for 15 years, and many items were priced at
10-40% below profitable levels.
Anson received a $142,000 grant from the TAA program for
the adjustment plan, which Carpinteri, NETAAC, and consultants
worked on.
Technical assistance was provided in two phases--first,
to get the "front house" (accounting and management informa-
tion systems) in order; secondly, to reorganize the "back
house" (costing and production). Carpinteri wrote up a
scope of work proposal, and consultants were hired after a
2-3 month competitive bidding process. It took 3 months
from time of certification to receipt of technical assistance.
NETAAC management and accounting experts helped organize
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the accounting and management information systems for Anson.
One of the most significant improvements was installing a
new computer, for which NETAAC hired an outside consultant,
and establishing a new accounting system. The Andersons had
purchased an IBM mainframe computer ten years ago. Unfortunate-
ly, according to Carpinteri, "It was very powerful but didn't
do anything." So Anson installed a new NCR 94 mainframe
computer, paid for with some of the financing made possible
by the $3 million TAA loan guarantee, that is more compatible
with its needs. NETAAC and management reorganized the firm's
accounting system so that each division reports its profits
and losses separately. Accounts receivable and payable were
loaded on the computer. In order to make. controls more
manageable, NETAAC and management also cut the number of
different styles offered from 3,000 down to 750. When all
the systems are set up, the new computer will keep track of
about 90% of Anson's total sales and inventories.
Now that NETAAC and management have gotten the front
house in order, they are working on improving costing and
production standards, for which they've hired teams of
industrial engineers and other consultants. The consultants
have costed all the firm's costs of doing business. Prices
were raised 30-40%, and now Anson can be sure that everything
that is shipped out will bring in a profit.
Industrial engineers also introduced laser technology
into the plant. The laser equipment was purchased with some
of the federal funds. Currently, this technology is only
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used in the company's writing division. Anson's new manage-
ment is confident that this new technology promises growth
for its "recognition and incentive products" division (for
example, key rings, tie tacks, and cuff links sold directly
to corporations), currently about 30% of sales, because it
allows the manufacturer to engrave names or company logos
on '"any surface" in seconds.
Management and NETAAC have also improved Anson's market-
ing and sales programs and products. Anson now sells directly
to major retail chains such as J.C. Penney, Sears, Zale's,
Gordon's, and Robinson's, and this accounts for 20% of sales.
Anson has also changed its markup procedure, offering an
additional 20% markup, on top of the 50% markup offered by
most manufacturers to retail stores, in order to win space.
The firm has upgraded the quality of its packaging to a
velveteen covered metal box, which comes with the cheapest
to the most expensive items Anson sells. The company has
redesigned its writing instrument line, and is selling the
products in prestigious stores like Tiffany and Neiman-Marcus.
Finally, Anson is setting up a nationwide force to sell its
boxes and countertop displays to jewelry and general merchan-
dise stores. Recently, Sears, Roebuck and Co. placed Anson
displays into 340 Sears stores.
All of these changes were made possible by the TAA
technical assistance and a $3 million federal loan guarantee
which Anson received under the TAA program. The backing of
the federal government gave private lenders more confidence
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in Anson, but it still wasn't easy raising funds, Carpinteri
said. He was turned down by seven banks. They told him,
"The jewelry and textile business were losing business. They
went down the tubes once, they're not going to be there."
Finally, "at the nth hour," in June of 1983 Fleet Credit
Corporation came through with a $3 million loan. Carpinteri
assemble-d a total financing package of $5 million, arranging
the other $2 million himself. The $3 million is guaranteed
and collateralized by the federal government. It is for
12% (1.5% above prime at the time) over 7 years.
Impacts of Assistance
The reorganization plan has improved Anson's performance
significantly. Carpinteri started with a troubled but eco-
nomically viable company in September of 1982, and by March
of 1983, the firm was showing a profit every month. By the
summer of 1983, he'd "cut out the hemorrhaging" and gotten
the firm on a consistent basis. As of April 1984, less than
one year after he purchased the firm, sales were up to
$15 million. He's aiming for $20 million in annual sales
this fiscal year.
Anson had only 165 employees when it was forced into
bankruptcy in September 1982. By December 1983, employment
had grown to 500 workers. In April 1984 there were 340-360
employees. [The decline was due to the cyclical nature of
production in the costume jewelry industry.] The number of
employees is growing and Carpinteri projects 500 employees by
June 1984. Eventually, he believes that Anson will have
500-600 employees, making it one of the largest employers in
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Rhode Island.
Carpinteri proudly stated that he turned the company
around without firing one person and that he'd actually raised
wage and salary levels of employees. He does not believe in
the strategy of slicing costs to reorganize a firm, "like the
Harvard MBA stories," as he said.
Morale among employees is up, according to Carpinteri.
Anson has instituted an evaluation system and all employees
have received wage and salary increases, based on this
evaluation system. Productivity has increased substantially,
but Carpinteri could not give any figures. The company
trained in-house people to operate its new laser technology,
rather than hiring from the outside.
[Anson is not unionized, so I could not confirm these
statements on the impacts of reorganization on the firm's
employees.]
When asked if he thought that Anson was competitive with
imports, Carpinteri said that it will never be competitive
with imports. The firm is only competitive because of the
"programs" and services it can offer which foreign producers
can't. Rather than selling one item of jewelry, Anson will
manufacture a program of 100 different items to sell to
stores, thus making sure that stores carry a representative
selection of its merchandise. He believes that when all their
new systems are completed in six months, Anson will be highly
competitive with imports and its market share will increase.
Carpinteri had several offers to buy the firm during the
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reorganization, but he has no plans to sell Anson.
Management's Evaluation of the TAA Program
Carpinteri believes that the TAA program was critical to
Anson's recovery. "Without the technical assistance and the
money, there'd be no Anson," he said.
"The company was dying, going down the tubes," he said.
He stated that if he and Rhode Island legislators hadn't been
so persistent down in Washington, the company wouldn't have
made it. Rep. Claudine Schneider and Sen. John Chaffee lobbied
on Anson's behalf. Carpinteri and the legislators used this
argument: "Do you want 400 unemployed people in the streets?"
Carpinteri also testified in Washington in support of the TAA
program when its funding was threatened because he feels it
did such a good job with his firm.
He got along well with the NETAAC staff and consultants.
He described the program as "terrific," and his only suggestion
for improvement was that NETAAC hire a public relations person.
As he said, Rhode Island has lost over 30,000 jobs in his
industry alone, but nobody knows about the program.
When asked whether he felt the government should provide
assistance to firms, he replied, "I think they have to." He
feels that the government has to do something to make firms
and industries like his more competitive.
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Chapter 5. Evaluation of the Trade Adjustment Assistance
Program for Firms and Analysis of Case Studies
The statistics presented in Chapter 1 show that, at least
in terms of number of firms assisted, the TAA program has had
a large impact nationally and on the New England region. But
what impact has this assistance had on the competitiveness of
firms and how efficient has the program been in delivering its
services? This chapter will evaluate the TAA program for firms
and analyze the three case studies. My procedure for evaluating
the program is to look at the survival rate of firms assisted
by the program, summarize the results of my other firm inter-
views regarding the efficiency of service delivery, summarize
other studies on the TAA program for firms, and analyze the
case studies to determine the impacts of the TAA program on
each firm. I will also discuss some of the industrial policy
issues the cases raise. The next chapter will discuss these
industrial policy issues in greater depth, looking at the
relevance of the TAA experience for economic adjustment
policies at the federal and state level.
Impacts of the TAA Program on Firm Survival
The loan default rate of firms assisted by the TAA program
has improved over time. The program had a very high loan
default rate when it was under the EDA. Approximately 65%
of the companies which received TAA loans through 1981 went
into default. But after 1981, when it was transferred to the
ITA, officials tightened the program's loan criteria and
encouraged firms to seek financing from private lenders.
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Most importantly, the TAA program shifted its focus from
financial to technical assistance. 6 1
There are some methodological problems in determining
the survival rate for TAA-assisted firms. Some firms receive
financial assistance only, some technical assistance only,
and some both. There will be different survival rates for
each group. Further, some of the firms that are "on death's
doorstep" when they come to the program require large amounts
of financial assistance, and.these firms will drag down the
average survival rate if they fail. Another problem is
whether liquidiations and changes of ownership should be
considered as firm failures. 6 2
But given these methodological problems, survival rate
figures have been developed for the program. Daniel Fennell,
Director of the Mid-Atlantic TAAC, working with the Office
of Trade Adjustment Assistance, compiled data from all 11
TAACs in 1983 showing the number of firms assisted and the
number still surviving during the period from fiscal year
1979 to fiscal year 1983 (to date and estimated). The data
include firms which received technical, financial, or tech-
nical and financial assistance. Firms which experienced a
change of ownership but were still in business were counted
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as survivors.
6 1 Elizabeth Wiener, "As It Begins To Help, Trade Adjustment
Faces The Axe," The Boston Globe, 7/11/83, p. 25.
6 2 Interview with Arthur Levine, Financial Loans Division,
EDA, U.S. Department of Commerce, 4/27/84.
6 3 Interview with Daniel Fennell, Director, Mid-Atlantic TAAC,
5/18/84.
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Table 6 shows the survival rate figures for the U.S. and
for the states served by the New England TAAC. The survival rate
for firms assisted by all 11 TAACs during this period is 84%.
The survival rate for NETAAC-assisted firms is 94%.64
6 4 In order to derive a rough benchmark for success of the
program, these survival rates can be compared to the overall
U.S. small business survival rate.
Table 7 shows the survival rate for small businesses for
periods of 4, 9, and 10 years after start-up as a function of
initial employment size. In order to be as conservative as
possible and to exclude "Mom and Pop" operations that would
be expected to have a high failure rate, I will use the figures
for firms with 101-500 employees. The survival rates for
this group of firms are: beyond 4 years, 56%; 9 years, 37%;
and 10 years, 28%.
TABLE 7
THE PROPORTION OF FIRMS THAT SURVIVE BEYOND 4, 9, AND 10 YEARS
AFTER START-UP, AS A FUNCTION OF INITIAL EMPLOYMENT SIZE
Proport-ion That
Initial Size
(Employees)
1-20
21-50
51-100
101-500
500 and over
Beyond 4
Years
.374
.536
.557
.564
.677
Beyond 9 Beyond 10
Beyond 9
Years
.173
.352
.364
.368
.425
Survive
Beyond 10
Years
.086
.262
.274
.283
.357
So-urce: Harvey A. Garn and Larry C. Ledebur, The Estimation
of Development Impacts (Washington, D.C.: The Urban
Institute, March 1981), p. 26; calculated from table
4-6 in David Birch, The Job Generation Process,
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Program on Neighborhood and
Regional Change, 1979), based on data for 1969-76;
cited in Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison,
The Deindustrialization of America (New York: Basic
Books, 1982), p. 223.
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TABLE 6
SURVIVAL RATE OF FIRMS ASSISTED BY
THE TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
(FOR FISCAL YEAR 1979, 1980, 1981,
1982, 1983 TO DATE AND ESTIMATED)
Number of Firms
Location
U.S.
Number of
Firms Assisted
2,240
Surviving
Fiscal Year 1983
1,877
Survival
Rate
84%
Connecticut
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Rhode Island
Vermont
New England
Subtotal:
65
28
59
28
233247
53
33
15
47
33
14
441 414 94%
Source: Daniel Fennell, Director, Mid-Atlantic TAAC, 5/18/84
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Efficiency of Service Delivery
Table 8 summarizes the results of my 10 other firm inter-
views. (Please refer to "Background and Methodology of Study,"
pp. 7-10.) I've divided the firms into categories of positive,
neutral, and negative experiences with the program based on a
subjective evaluation of their responses. Three had a positive
experience, one a neutral experience, and six negative ex-
periences with the program.
Ten firms is too small a sample to make any scientific
conclusions about the program. But some very clear patterns
do emerge from the interviews and they were confirmed in
conversations with other people connected to the program.
Five of the six firms with negative experiences expressed
frustration over the long time period required for assistance,
or because they'd gone through lots of paperwork and never
got anything out of the program. One of the three firms
64(continued)
There are methodological problems in comparing the TAA firm
survival rates with the overall U.S. small business survival
rate. It could be argued that firms 3, 5, or 10 years after
start-up are different from TAA-assisted firms, which may
have been stable peformers for a long time and only recently
experienced business problems as a result 'of import competi-
tion. And the biggest problem with interpreting Fennell's
data is that there is no way of knowing whether TAA or some
other factor was responsible for the 84% survival rate. It
would probably be more valid to compare the.TAA survival
rate with the survival rate of firms in the high risk, troubled
firm loan portfolio of a commercial bank during the same time
period.
But, given these methodological problems, the comparison
does give a crude basis for evaluating the
program. An 84% survival rate is a significant improvement
over the 28-54% survival range for small businesses as a
whole. This test indicates that the TAA program has had a
positive impact on the performance of small businesses.
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TABLE 8
FIRM'S EXPERIENCES WITH TAA PROGRAM
Firm and Location Product Certified Comments on TAA Program
(POSITIVE EXPERIENCE)
May Optical Co.
Wareham, MA
Parker Metal Corp.
Worcester, MA
Mohawk Industries,
Inc.
Adams, MA
Plastic eyeglass
frames
Television antennas,
shopping carts,
fasteners, and
other hardware
Stoves
1980
1981
1981
Received financial and technical
assistance for sales and marketing,
very beneficial to firm
Received technical assistance for
manufacturing and cost programs,
beneficial to firm
Received technical assistance for
upgrading product and marketing,
beneficial to firm
(NEUTRAL EXPERIENCE)
Jones & Vining, Inc.
Braintree, MA
Shoe lasts and
soles
1981 President wasn't sure if firm
received any assistance, or only
minimal
(NEGATIVE EXPERIENCE)
Joan Fabrics Corp.
Lowell, MA
Upholstery fabrics 1980
and textile (Withdrawn)
machinery
Firm went through a lot of paperwork
because local TAAC said it would
be certified, but then Department
of Commerce determined that its
market had not been hit by imports
ul
Firm and Location
The Berlyn Corp.
Worcester, MA
Bedford Manufacturing
Corp.
Fall River, MA
Julius & Sons, Inc.
Boston, MA
Silin Manufacturing
Co.
Boston, MA
Leon Clothing
Manufacturing, Inc.
Boston, MA
ON
Comments on TAA Program
Thermoplastic
machinery
Women's clothing
Men's leather coats
and jackets
Women's dresses
and aprons
Men's coats
1980
1982
1980
1980
1980
Told that the program had fallen
apart and never received any
assistance
Went through a lot of paperwork
but received no assistance because
firm could not raise the 25%
matching funds required for
technical assistance
Filled out all the paperwork but
never got any assistance
Went through a lot of work but
never got anything out of the
program
President/Treasurer said that a
$10,000 technical assistance grant
for new technology was approved,
but assistance never came through
because of Reagan administration's
changes in program; ,had to deal
with three different TAAC directors
over 12-18 month period; gave up
in frustration
Source: Firm Interviews
Certif iedProduct
with positive experiences also complained about the timing.
Two of the six firms with negative experiences stated that
their problems were directly related to instability in the
program caused by the Reagan administration.
The most frequently expressed complaint about the program
is that it takes too long. This is problematic because timing
is a critical factor for business turnarounds. Frequently,
managers fail to recognize potential problem areas or assume
that they know their business "better than anyone else." By
the time the management of a troubled firm seeks outside help,
minor problems may have become serious or even fatal. 6 5
Gary Brooks, a consultant with the Pace Consulting Group of
Hartford, Connecticut, a management consulting firm which has
worked with the New England TAAC, stated that the time factor
was the most serious problem with the whole program. He said
that, on average, firms don't receive any assistance until a
minimum of nine months after application, by which time many
firms have already gone bankrupt. For example, a Massachusetts
furniture company which Pace managed for the program went
bankrupt because, even though banks were "extremely cooperative,"
the TAA process took two years.66 NETAAC's own figures state
that the average processing time, from certification petition
submission to receipt of loan funds, is 14-15 months.
6 7
6 5 Ron Nolan, "The Business Doctors," Connecticut Business
Review, September 1982.
6 6 Interview with Gary Brooks, Pace Consulting Group,12/29/83.
6 7 New England TAAC, New England Trade Adjustment Assistance
Center, Inc., Annual Report, October 1, 1982 - September 30,
1983, p. 5.
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John Nevin of General Bearing also complained about the
"massively time consuming" process required for the TAA
program.
A comparison with Small Business Administration loan
programs will help put this 14-15 month TAA waiting period
in perspective. The SBA's 7a loan program provides two types
of financial assistance: 1) Loan guarantees, where the SBA
guarantees 90% of a maximum $500,000 loan from private
lenders; and 2) Direct loans for up to $150,000. Funds can
be used for "any good business purpose." According to John
McKinney, Loan Officer, Boston district office, U.S. Small
Business Administration, processing time for loan guarantees
is 10 days; for direct loans, 3 weeks. SBA also offers a
faster turnaround loan guarantee program, the certified lender
program, where the bank does all the work. This only takes
3 days to process.68
The Reagan administration's attack on the TAA program
also appears to have seriously reduced its efficiency. The
uncertainty over the program's future ha's produced heavy staff
turnover at local TAACs, thus reducing their efficiency. This
is attested to in the experiences of one firm which had to
deal with three different TAAC directors over an 18-month
6 8 Interview with John McKinney, Loan Officer, Boston district
office, SBA, 4/30/84. Another source, who was involved in an
evaluation of the SBA 7a loan program, indicated that actual
loan processing times are longer than these figures indicate.
The certified lender program is faster than other SBA loan
programs, and was created to overcome historical problems of
time delays. (Interview with Beth Siegel, who helped conduct
a study of the SBA 7a loan program for Counsel for Community
Development, Cambridge, MA, in May 1983, 5/19/84.)
78
period beginning in 1980.69 The New England TAAC has had
two different directors in fiscal year 1983.70
The Reagan administration has also hampered the ability of
TAACs to publicize their services. In September 1981, a
"policy decision" prohibited TAACs from making direct contacts
with firms, which had been up to then their almost exclusive
channel for informing potential clients of the available
assistance. According to Charles Smith, Deputy Director of
Certification Division, his office was told that the Reagan
administration wanted to save money and the TAA program was
being too aggressive about getting firms into the program.71
Now TAACs have to rely on indirect contacts such as referrals
from former clients and organizations such as state economic
development agencies, industry associations, Chambers of
Commerce, banks, and CPAs. 7 2 Joseph Carpinteri's statement
that the NETAAC needs to hire a public relations person because
nobody has heard of the program in Rhode Island indicates that
this constraint does reduce the efficiency of the program.
Other Studies of the TAA Program
There is one other major study of the TAA program relevant
to firm assistance. It studied the impact of adjustment
assistance benefits to workers and firms in the Massachusetts
shoe industry. The problem with this study is that it looked
6 9 Interview with Edward Bernard, President and Treasurer,
Leon Clothing Manufacturing, Inc., Boston, MA, 3/14/84.
7 0 New England TAAC, Annual Report, p. 24.
71Interview with Charles Smith, 4/26/84.
7 2 Associated Research Analysis Corporation, Evaluation of the
Third Year, p. 7.
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at benefits under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which had
much stricter eligibility requirements than the Trade Act of
1974, and the study focused more on assistance to workers than
firms. Nevertheless, it concluded that TAA had positive short-
term effects on two of the three firms studied. The third
firm shut down two and one half years after qualifying for
assistance. The study found that the program was limited by
two factors: 1) It was relatively inaccessible because of
its stringent eligibility criteria; and 2) Most businesses
weren't interested in the program if they were on the verge
of closing and saw no future for the industry. 7 3
Analysis of Case Studies
Now I would like to analyze what the three case studies
illustrate about the impacts of the program and larger
issues of business strategy and industrial policy.
J&L Precision Bearings
The reorganization of J&L illustrates several points
about business strategies for turnarounds. Its problems were
caused by bad management. It is primarily a case of moderniz-
ing the production process in order to make a firm more com-
petitive with imports. This fits with the Department of
Commerce's recommendations to make the industry more competi-
tive. It also involves a change of ownership and a market
niche strategy.
7 3 McCarthy, The Shoe Industry in Massachusetts, pp. 127-135.
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The firm received both technical and financial assistance
from the TAA program. In addition to the diagnostic survey
and adjustment plan, technical assistance was provided by
consultants who modernized the production process at the old
plant. The financial assistance will be used for future
operations and to finance fixed assets and working capital.
It's not clear what this means, but presumably it will be
used for purchasing equipment and operating the new plant.
This will make sure that the firm can finish the job of
modernizing its production process (installing modern
equipment at the new plant) and is not limited by financial
factors once its production process has been brought up to
date.
It i.s impossible to predict what the impact of the TAA
program will be on J&L's competitive position, since it
hasn't begun production yet. However, given the new manage-
ment and the massive upgrading of its production process, it's
safe to say that J&L will be in a better position to take on
the competition than before.
General Bearing's market niche strategy--specializing in
fast delivery times at low prices--may give the company an
initial competitive edge when the new plant opens, but it is
questionable how long it will last. General Bearing is not
the only bearing manufacturer pursuing this strategy. Federal
Mogul, which manufactures for a different market segment of
the bearing industry (trucks, cars, and farm equipment) is
also basing its growth strategy on "just in time" delivery
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programs. In the past, Mogul would ship in large batches
once a month to its customers, but now it delivers smaller
batches several times a week. Mogul's philosophy is that
the bearings manufactured by different producers are basically
the same, so it needs to concentrate on "non-product variables"
like sales and service to stay ahead of the competition.7 4
Growing numbers of U.S. firms, especially in the auto in-
dustry, are demanding the "just in time" inventory method, a
business strategy developed by the Japanese. This is because
the currently high real level of interest rates gives companies
an incentive to keep inventories as lean as possible. 7 5
General Bearing may be able to gear its relatively small
production capacity to a narrow strategic target (flexible
production and fast delivery times), thus enjoying a cost
advantage over rival firms which are competing more broadly.
But if the demand for fast delivery programs grows, the
difference between General Bearing's strategic target and the
market as a whole will narrow. Other manufacturers of mini
precision bearings may copy General Bearing's strategy or
even outdo General Bearing by finding submarkets within
General Bearing's strategic target. 76
Whatever the impact, I think that the assistance provided
to General Bearing is an example of a bad public subsidy on
7 4 Nossiter, "Not the Same Old Grind," p. 33.
7 5
"Business Gets a Grip on Inventories," Business Week,
5/14/84, pp. 38-39.
7 6 Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy (New York: The Free
Press, 1980), pp. 38 and 46.
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two scores. First, it is an unnecessary subsidy. Nevin
himself stated that General Bearing could have reorganized
the firm on its own, without the TAA program. It's possible
that General Bearing violated the provision of the program
that "the firm will make all reasonable efforts to use its
own resources for economic development." If so, this con-
stitutes an abuse of the program. But it also violates a
fundamental economic development principle that scarce public
funds should not be used to displace financial resources
available from the private sector.
Secondly, the subsidy is questionable because it finances
a plant relocation. According to Charles Smith, Deputy
Director of Certification for the OTAA, the Trade Act of 1974
does not prohibit providing assistance to firms that are re-
locating plants. "But," Smith said, "If a relocation was
involved, we'd look very carefully at what they plan to do
for the workers." He gave moving expenses as an example.
"We don't want them creating employment in one area and un-
employment somewhere else," he added. 7 7
It could be argued that since TAA is a federal and not
a state program, it shouldn't matter if a firm uses public
funds to move a plant to another state. As long as it's
not moved overseas, jobs will still be created for American
workers.
But it's not clear why public funds for a program
designed to increase the competitiveness of U.S. firms should
7 7 Interview with Charles Smith, 4/26/84.
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be used to assist plant relocations, unless the firm can
prove that relocation is necessary in order to make the firm
more competitive. In this case, Nevin's reasons seem to be
legitimate from the perspective of his firm's profitability.
Industrial land in the new site costs one-fourth as much as
at the old site. The two-story structure vibrates too much
for precision machining. He claimed that taxes and con-
struction costs were higher in Massachusetts, and that General
Bearing wanted to consolidate its operations. He also listed
quality of life factors for the new location. There is no
way of determining whether the plant could have been com-
petitive in the Massachusetts location without access to
information on the firm's cost structure and the market for
mini precision bearings. Given that the plant is moving,
the arrangement worked out with the New York State TAAC to
hire and train trade-impacted workers in the new location
seems like an equitable plan. Nevertheless, this seems to be
an area for potential abuse of the program, especially if
there are labor problems at the original plant. The interests
of the former employees would be better served if General
Bearing reopened the Shopsbury plant after retooling and
offered them their old jobs back. But this illustrates one
problem with the TAA program for firms from labor's point
of view: It is primarily a business subsidy program, so the
interests of assisted firms' employees, even though they
must be taken into account in the adjustment plan, are only
a secondary consideration.
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It's also interesting that the reorganization plan does
not seems to have given "adequate consideration to the interests
of" the firm's workers with regard to rehiring. While General
Bearing plans to rehire 10-12 of the original employees (if
they're willing to move out of state), the only reason stated
was to reduce the firm's training costs.
Cunningham's statement that the TAA program gave General
Bearing enough time to make the old plant more competitive--
it "slowed down" the rapid forces of economic change--is
significant for my later discussion of economic adjustment
policy.
Abbott Machine
Abbott's problems were also caused by management failure.
The previous management failed to reinvest enough in research
and development to keep its products competitive with foreign
producers. It is a striking example of how public assistance
can be provided for new product development to turn around a
firm in an industry suffering from massive decline. Un-
fortunately, it also illustrates the importance of macro-
economic variables (the exchange rate) on the outcome of
microeconomic policy. Abbott is a vivid example of how the
relative strength of the U.S. dollar is hurting the ability
of U.S. manufacturers to compete with foreign producers.
The TAA program provided technical and financial assis-
tance to Abbott. In addition to the diagnostic survey and
adjustment plan, technical assistance was provided by con-
sultants who did the research and development work on the
85
new textile winding machine. The $1 million federal loan was
used for working capital and financing the development of the
machine.
Two questions must be answered to determine the impact
of the TAA program on Abbott: 1) Would Abbott's product be
technologically competitive if it weren't for the strong
dollar? and 2) Could Abbott have developed the new product
without the TAA program?
Textile machinery industry specialists provided some
answers to the first question. Thomas Jackson, a textile
machinery industry analyst with the U.S. Department of Commerce,
was familiar with Abbott, but not with the Model 81 winder.
He did state, however, that he believed Smith's story that
the exchange rate was the cause of the company's problems.
He couldn't say whether technology or the price of the dollar
was the more important factor in explaining the competitive
problems of firms in the industry, but he did say that "The
price of the dollar is one of the major factors in their
inability to compete." When asked how many firms are in
Abbott's position--a good product, but hurt by the strength
of the dollar, he responded, "To be more or less exact, just
about all of them." He admitted, however, that in some
market segments such as shuttle looms the American product
is technologically inferior to foreign machines.78
Harry Buzzerd, Executive Vice President of the American
7 8 Interview with Thomas Jackson, U.S. Department of Commerce,
4/24/84.
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Textile Machinery Association (ATMA), would not comment on
Abbott's position because he said the ATMA represents the
interests of all its members and does not promote one product
over another. When asked if there were many other textile
machinery industry firms in Abbott's position, he responded,
"There's absolutely no question that in '81-'82, it
[the market for U.S. firms] was depressed for several reasons.
First, the depressed world market. And second, the high
value of the dollar." 7 9 Buzzerd also stated, "If I recall
correctly, the Abbott winder was marketed at the worst time
possible in terms of the textile industry's economic circum-
stances." 80
These comments by industry analysts support Derrick
Smith's claim that the exchange rate was responsible for
the firm not being competitive. The only way to really
determine if the Model 81 winder is fully competitive techno-
logically is to call textile machinery customers and con-
sultants. The problem with this method is that Abbott
hasn't sold the Model 81 to any customers yet, so no
meaningful comparisons could be made.
Kathi Smith answer-ed the second question when she said
that Abbott had neither the financial or technical capacity
to develop the Model 81 winder on its own.
7 9 Interview with Harry Buzzerd, Executive Vice President,
American Textile Machinery Association, 4/25/84.
8 0 Letter from Harry Buzzerd, 4/27/84.
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Anson
Management failure was clearly the most significant
cause of Anson's problems and its revival was due to major
changes in the way the firm is managed. Its competitive
strategy also relies on market niches, improved sales and
marketing programs (such as provision of "services" that
can't be matched by foreign producers), new products, and
new production processes (laser technology).
It is too early to predict the long-run impact of the
TAA program on the firm, but Anson appears to be a truly
remarkable case of a firm reorganization. The TAA technical
assistance provided Anson with teams of consultants in the
areas of management and controls. One problem in determing
the impact of the program is that even though Carpinteri
stated that Anson would not have survived without the TAA
program, the process of reorganization involved so many
changes that it's hard to isolate what was caused by TAA
from what was caused by dynamic new management. The TAA
technical assistance was at least partly responsible for
installing the new computer, improving accounting systems,
costing products, new technology, and marketing and sales
programs. The $3 million federal loan guarantee gave
private lenders enough confidence to invest in Anson.
Carpinteri stated that his firm was turned down by seven
different banks. Without this financing, made possible by
the backing of the federal government, Anson could not have
possibly emerged from bankruptcy.
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Some will argue that Anson's turnaround was so success-
ful becauge it already held a large share of its different
market niches, and its experience could not be repeated too
many times. The case for this argument is not compelling.
Taking Anson's writing instrument division as an example,
its market share in this niche can't be too large because
the company faces formidable competition from such industry
giants as Cross, Mont Blanc, Parker, and Papermate, all of
whom produce for the high end of the pen market. Anson's
success is related to much more than a market niche strategy,
as its reorganization involved extensive changes in manage-
ment and controls to streamline the company into a more
efficient operation. Also, a small firm which targets its
production and marketing capacity on a market niche may
enjoy cost advantages over larger firms like Anson, which
attempt to cover a wide range of markets.
The employment impacts of the introduction of the new
laser technology need to be investigated further. If the
technology displaces labor, will the increase in productivity
made possible by the laser technology give such a boost to
Anson's market share in its "recognition and incentive
products" division that share-related increases in employment
will offset any decreases in employment related to automation?
One of the most striking features of Anson's turnaround--
and the aspect that sets it apart from the firm reorganizations
described in the pages of Business Week--is the fact that
Carpinteri saved the company without firing one single person.
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He's actually raised the wage and salary levels of employees
since the company started showing a profit. This runs con-
trary to the dominant argument made by American management
that sacrifices by labor--in the form of massive layoffs
and wage and benefit concessions--will be necessary in order
to restructure U.S. industry into a new "lean and mean"
version that can compete in the international marketplace.
Management Failure and Firm Failure
These three case studies each illustrate some unique
aspects of the economic adjustment process, but they also
share one very interesting feature: In all three cases,
management failure was the most significant cause of the
firms' problems. J&L had been seriously mismanaged and under-
financed, according to both Cunningham and Nevin. The pre-
vious management had not made advances in the firm's produc-
tion process needed to keep up with the competition, and
they had developed no marketing or sales strategy. Abbott
suffered because the previous management had not invested in
developing new products that would be competitive with imports,
according to the Smiths. This firm's problems support the
general analysis of the textile machinery industry that lack
of technological innovation, rather than labor cost differ-
entials, is the main cause of the decline of the U.S. industry.
Management failure was also a major cause of Anson's bank-
ruptcy. Carpinteri did admit that low-wage competition was
the cause of the firm's troubles with imports, and the
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recession of the early 1980's was clearly a factor in the
firm's demise. But it is interesting that with new manage-
ment and TAA technical and financial assistance to improve
management and controls, the firm has recovered and is
growing, even though competition from low-wage countries has
not subsided.
This conclusion is also confirmed by the statements of
Richard McLaughlin, Executive Director of NETAAC, that the
main sources of problems for client firms are: 1) Management;
2) Market; or Management failure to reinvest enough to keep
up plant and equipment.81
This finding is so striking because the inability of
American firms to compete against foreign producers is fre-
quently blamed on high labor costs. High labor costs were
mentioned as a problem in only one of the three case studies,
Anson, and even there Carpinteri laid the blame principally
on poor management. Some more enlightened factions of the
business community have criticized American managers for
focusing too much on the bottom line rather than taking a
long-range view,82 but "excessive" labor costs remains the
dominant explanation for why American firms can't compete
with foreign producers. Management uses this argument to
demand wage concessions from labor in firms and industries
threatened by foreign competition.
8 1 Interview with McLaughlin, 11/28/83.
8 2 Robert Hayes and William Abernathy, "Managing Our Way to
Economic Decline," Harvard Business Review, July-August 1980,
pp. 67-77.
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Of course, it is true that low-wage foreign producers will
have the competitive edge when it comes to mass production of
standardized products using low-skilled labor and widely
available technology. It's also true that the U.S. cannot
compete in integrated steel production at United Steelworkers
wage levels when South Korean steel workers earn less than
$3/hour. But as my case studies show, U.S. firms in some
industries can remain competitive by strategies other than
slashing labor costs.
These three case studies are also relevant to the
question of what should be done to assist troubled firms in
declining industries. There is a popular belief that the
decline of "sunset" industries is inevitable, and that
nothing can or should be done to "bail out" failing firms
and industries. My case studies disprove the myth that
nothing can be done to turn around troubled firms. Whether
or not anything should be done--and if so, under what con-
ditions, especially when public funds are involved--is
another issue that will be taken up in the next section.
Summary Evaluation
To conclude my evaluation of the TAA program for firms,
it is a program which can be of benefit to troubled firms
in import-impacted industries, but it suffers from serious
administrative and political problems. The survival rate of
firms assisted by the program is 84% nationally. The technical
and financial assistance provided by the program has succeeded
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in making some firms more competitive through changes in
management, improvements in the production process, new
product development, or market niche strategies. However,
the long time periods required for receipt of assistance and
instability and uncertainty over the future of the program
caused by the Reagan administration's attempts to eliminate
it have reduced its efficiency.
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Chapter 6. Policy Implications of the TAA Program for Firms
The experience of the TAA program for firms raises many
questions relevant to the current debate over national and
state industrial policy. The beauty of analyzing a program
like TAA is that it allows one to bring such discussions away
from the abstract level of "picking winners and losers" and
"free trade versus protectionism" and to look at these im-
portant questions more concretely. In this final chapter, I
would like to consider two sets of questions: 1) What lessons
does the TAA program for firms provide for developing economic
adjustment policies at the national level? Should the govern-
ment attempt to save troubled firms in declining industries
and if so under what conditions? What is economic viability?
What are the limits of competitive strategies? How could the
existing TAA program for firms be improved? and 2) What does
this federal program imply for the design and limitations of
state industrial policies to assist troubled firms in mature
industries?
TAA and National Economic Adjustment Policy
I define economic adjustment policies as policies that
make it easier for firms, industries, workers, and communities
to adjust to structural changes in the economy.
There are three major economic adjustment policies pos-
sible for dealing with the problems of firms in older industries:
1) Providing assistance to speed up the exit of firms from an
industry; 2) Implementing protectionist measures without re-
quiring the firm to become more competitive; and 3) Providing
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assistance to make firms and industries more competitive with
imports. This obviously is the approach taken by the TAA
program for firms.
Some economists point to the "hypermobility of capital"
-- the rapid speed at which capital moves--as the major cause
of the problems of deindustrialization in America. Capital
is moving too fast for firms, industries, communities, and
workers to adjust to structural changes in the economy.83
The TAA program plays the important role of "slowing down"
the velocity of capital to a socially manageable rate, to
provide breathing space for U.S. firms to be reorganized on
a more competitive basis.
Should the Government Try to Save Troubled Firms?
The TAA program for firms certainly has a mixed track
record. Administrative and political problems have reduced
its efficiency, but it appears to have improved the competi-
tive position of small businesses in import-impacted industries.
It demonstrates that it is possible to turn around firms.
This begs the question: Should the government intervene to
save troubled firms in import-impacted industries? This issue
has been cast in the media spotlight today--in terms of who
voted for and against the Chrysler loan guarantee--as the
two leading contendors for the Democratic presidential nomina-
tion, Walter Mondale and Gary Hart, debate industrial policy.
The TAA program gives some answers to these questions.
8 3 Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization
of America (New York: Basic Books, 1982), pp. 105-107.
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There are at least four arguments for why the government
should assist troubled firms, like the TAA program does:
1) Trade policies made by the federal government, through
their effects on the relative prices of commodities, have
major impacts on the ability of U.S. firms and industries to
compete and on the security of workers and communities. Even
though U.S. consumers benefit from the lower prices made
possible by "free trade," according to the neoclassical
model, national free trade policies result in a welfare loss
for some groups in society, and these groups should somehow
be compensated; 2) If it's possible for adjustment assistance
to make firms more competitive, then assistance should be
provided. Besides increasing the competitiveness of American
industry, it will save jobs and avert the other impacts of
plant closings on workers and communities; 3) An industry may
be considered so vital to national security that it must be
saved. The miniature precision ball bearing industry is one
example; steel and machine tools are often cited as others;
4) Other nations assist their firms and industries with R&D
support, cooperative marketing arrangements, below-market
financing, and export subsidies. If the U.S. is to be com-
petitive in international markets, then it must do the same.
There are basically two arguments leveled against pro-
viding government assistance to firms: 1) "Bailing out"
"dying" firms and industries is inefficient from an economic
point of view. Critics on the right argue that firms that
can't survive the discipline of the market should go under.
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Critics on the left are concerned about "lemon socialism,"
that supporting industrial dinosaurs will be a drain on public
resources; 2) There is no need to interfere in the free market
because the unfettered "invisible hand" of capitalism will
produce the best outcome for everybody. The government should
not erect barriers to free trade or prop up dying industries.
The U.S. should be purged of losing industries like apparel,
footwear, and textiles and specialize in those industries
where it has a comparative advantage. The argument goes that
the U.S. will export its computers, financial services, and
beef to Japan and it will buy Japanese autos, steel, and
consumer electronics. It is argued that some groups will suffer
adjustment pains, but capital should be allowed to flow to
its most efficient uses. Nations will produce what they're
best at and free trade will bring U.S. consumers lower prices.
This is the position held by the Reagan administration and it
drives the administration's attempts to eliminate trade
adjustment assistance to firms, industries, workers, and
communities.
In response to the first criticism, it is true that if
the government channels investment and technical assistance
to firms and industries, there is a real danger of rewarding
inefficiency if it's not done properly. However, if the
basic criterion used by the TAA program--that the firm must
be economically viable--is applied to government assistance
programs, this will lessen the danger of rewarding inefficiency.
(Please refer to "What is Economic Viability?" pp. 100-102.)
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And if aid is absolutely conditioned on a well-defined program
to restructure the firm so it is more competitive, then it
will promote economic efficiency.
There are three problems with the free trade argument.
First, the global marketplace does not operate under conditions
of free trade anymore. The neoclassical notion of "comparative
advantage" on which the Ricardian concept of free trade relies
has broken down with the increasing mobility of capital and
the ability of nations to transform their comparative advantage
by technological means. The "factor endowments" which were
thought to determine a nation's comparative advantage--,
labor, capital, and resources--are no longer fixed. Further,
governments intervene to change the competitive positions of
their domestic firms and industries.84 As the case of Abbott
Machine illustrates, Japan and Western European governments
promote exports by their textile machinery producers with
R&D subsidies, financing, guarantees, and marketing con-
sortiums. And the massive R&D subsidies given by the U.S.
Depa-rtment of Defense to American industry can hardly be
described as a free market system.
Secondly, t-he argument breaks down because it's not
clear that these structural changes in the economy are a
desirable or even a possible outcome. Current research on
the "disappearing middle" indicates that the U.S. would
experience a drastic decline in its standard of living
8 4 Rob Kuttner, "The Free Trade Fallacy," The New Republic,
March 28, 1983, pp. 16-20.
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if its manufacturing base erodes and is replaced by a high-tech,
service economy. Besides, a service economy is unsustainable
if it does not have a manufacturing base to provide services
to.
Third, it's not clear that the U.S. does have a compara-
tive advantage in the "winning" industries that free trade
proponents would like to see sweep the nation's economy free
of the "losers." As discussed in Chapter 1, the TAA program
has been serving an increasing number of firms in industries
categorized as winners by some--computer manufacturing,
computer peripheral equipment, photocopying equipment.
Apparently, even these industries need adjustment assistance
to remain competitive with foreign producers. Surely, the
free trade proponents wouldn't argue that computer manufactur-
ing is a "dying" U.S. industry and should be allowed to fail.
To do so would undermine their whole argument that the U.S.
economy will prosper by specializing in these products.
While I argue the general case for government assistance,
the decision to assist individual firms can only be made on
a case-by-case basis. If feasibility studies show that a
firm can be saved, then public dollars may be justified.
The social costs of a plant closing should be taken into
account when the government is deciding whether or not a
firm should be allowed to fail, but I can see no rationale
for burdening management, employees, the community, or the
taxpayers with a firm that has no chance of survival.
However, if a plant closing is inevitable, then adjustment
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assistance should be provided to workers and communities.
If the federal government is going to provide technical
or financial assistance to private firms, what quid pro quos
should assistance be.conditional upon? The TAA program
suggests two conditions: 1) Aid should be conditioned on
an explicit contract between the government and management
(and labor? See "Improving the TAA Program for Firms," pp. 105-6.)
that the firm will be reorganized to be more competitive;
and 2) Aid should truly account for the interests of the
firm's employees.
What is Economic Viability?
It is important to look more critically at the notion
of "economic viability" since this is the condition which
determines whether assistance will proceed past the diagnostic
survey in the TAA program and because I argue that only
economically viable firms should be considered for government
assistance.
When a government program for assistance reviews firm's
applications, it will find some cases where firms clearly
are not economically viable. The plant and equipment may be
so outdated that it can't possibly be updated to competitive
levels given the resources available under the government
program. There may be no market for the firm's product, or
the product may be vastly technologically inferior to com-
peting products. The financial structure of a firm may be
so heavily burdened with debt that it just can't survive
unless it has a massive infusion of equity capital.
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But all cases may not be so clear-cut, and there is a
danger in defining economic viability too narrowly. The
major point is that public policy and planning can change the
business environment in ways that affect the viability of
firms. An industry-wide assistance program could establish
a center to pioneer in the research and development of new
production technologies and make these technologies available
to individual firms that could not afford to develop the
technology on their own. In this case, public intervention
and economies of scale change the rules of the game so that
firms in a declining industry can become economically viable.
(Please see description of Footwear Revitalization Program,
pp. 106-107.) The government can create markets for products
where they didn't exist before. The U.S. Department of Defense
does this with its massive R&D subsidies to industry to
develop new, defense-related products and its procurement
policies which provide a steady source of demand for firms'
products. These public policies, now used mainly in the
defense sector, could be applied to other sectors of the
economy. For example, if the federal government were
committed to building the nation's mass transit systems,
this would open up whole new markets and expand existing
markets for troubled firms in the machine tool, transporta-
tion, steel, and auto industries that might otherwise be
written off as not economically viable. Public assistance
programs can provide firms with the capacity to develop
new products for which there is a market or push firms into
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focusing on a market niche. Finally, public equity capital
can breathe new life into companies burdened with debt.
In some cases, public intervention can make firms eco-
nomically viable that would otherwise be written off as
unviable and unworthy of assistance by a narrow approach
to analyzing firms.
The Limits of Competitive Strategy
The U.S. industrial system is experiencing sweeping
changes in the ways in which firms and industries are meeting
the challenge of international competition. The plans of
General Motors and Toyota to engage in a joint venture
at the Fremont, California plant illustrates only one of the
possibilities. In my case studies, I have discussed some
of the problems with the current strategies of U.S. firms
to remain competitive in a world of increasing global
competition. These issues need to be discussed further, since
promoting increased competitiveness is the rationale for the
whole TAA program and I also argue that government assistance
to private industry should be conditioned on plan-s to increase
the competitiveness of firms. I can't predict what the
impacts of these business strategies will be but it's important
to at least ask some questions.
' There is a downside to each of the competitive business
strategies being pursued by U.S. firms and industries, as
illustrated in the case studies. The TAA program appears to
have increased the short-run performance of firms, but will
these strategies work in the long run and what will be their
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employment impacts?
The problem with the market niche strategy, as MIT
economist Lester Thurow notes, is that, first, the niche
isn't all that big, and secondly, it's not just the Japanese
that are competing for the same market niche as U.S. producers,
buy many other nations as well. For example, if Rhode
Island jewelry manufacturers target the high end of the
jewelry market in order to avoid competing with low-wage
Asian countries for the low end, they will be competing
intensely with Italian companies, which have also targeted
the high fashion jewelry market niche.85 This raises the
question of how long a market niche strategy will provide
a firm with a competitive edge. Nevertheless, this strategy
is a growing trend', whether the targeted sector is a product
(pre-packaged mini precision ball bearings ready for
installation) or a service ("just in time" delivery systems).
The major problem with modernizing the production process
is that it displaces labor. This raises two issues: 1) Will
the technology increase the productivity of the firm so much
that it is propelled into a much higher market share, and
increases in employment due to increased market share will
offset displacement of labor due to automation? 2) Is it
better to lose some of a plant's workforce from automation
rather than having to shut down the entire plant? Or is it
better to cut excess capacity in an industry by closing down
8 5 Lecture, Lester Thurow, Professor of Economics, MIT, given
at MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning, 4/23/84.
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inefficient plants rather than losing the entire industry?
This is the argument being made by the Mitterand government
in its plans to rationalize the French steel industry.
The strategy of U.S. firms to maintain their competitive
edge by new product development grows increasingly difficult
when other major competing nations have the same technological
capabilities. The textile machinery industry provides an
example. All of the leading producers--Japan, Western Europe,
and the U.S.--have the potential to be at the high innovation
stage of the product cycle.
The case of Abbott also illustrates that what any one
firm can do is limited by macroeconomic forces beyond its
control, such as the relative strength of a nation's currency.
Finally, competitive strategies run the risk of turning
into a game between nations of "who can pay its workers the
lowest wage."86 This runs contrary to the goals of economic
development--to raise people's standard of living.
Policy makers need to be asking these questions when
developing economic adjustment policies based on promoting
the competitiveness of firms and industries.
Improving the TAA Program for Firms
How could the TAA program for firms be reorganized so it
would more efficiently achieve its objective of restoring the
competitiveness of firms and safeguard the interests of employees
at the same time?
8 6 Kuttner, "The Free Trade Fallacy," pp. 19-21.
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First, the program must be guaranteed stability. This
will not happen under the present administration. A more
certain future for the program would reduce staff turnover
at TAACs and allow federal administrators to plan for improv-
ing the efficiency of the program. Also, firms would be
more interested in investing the necessary time for the program
if they knew it would be around.
A Democratic administration could put the program on
more solid ground, but the long time periods required for
firms to receive assistance will remain unless the program is
radically reorganized. There are no easy answers to this
problem. If there were, they would have already been im-
plemented because timing has been a complaint since the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962.
One possibility is for the TAACs to be authorized to
provide both financial and technical assistance. The biggest
delays in the program seem to be related to provision of
financial assistance, and bureaucratic delays with Washington
appear to be the main cause of the timing problem. The
Department of Commerce could distribute funds to the 11 TAACs,
and the TAACs would decide who gets financial assistance and
distribute the loans and loan guarantees. There would have to
be strong public oversight of the TAACs in order to avoid
abuse of the program.
I feel that the firm's employees should be more involved
in the adjustment assistance plan. The TAA program does not
always score too high on accounting for the interests of firms'
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employees because it is primarily a business subsidy program.
The primary concern is restoring the profitability of firms,
which is assumed to benefit the workers. Even though manage-
ment must show how its adjustment plan considers the interests
of the firm's employees, this is only a secondary consideration.
On economic efficiency grounds, workers may have valuable
ideas on how to make the firm more productive. On equity
grounds, the workers will be most directly affected by the
impact of the reorganization plan. The adjustment assistance
process could be an attempt at "tripartitism" at the level
of the firm. This raises the interesting possibility of
whether a group of workers could use the TAA program to save
an economically viable plant that management planned on
abandoning. Employees probably would not want to wait two
years for federal financial assistance, but the technical
assistance which the program can deliver faster is one possible
option for workers considering buyouts of import-impacted firms.
It could be argued that industry-wide trade adjustment
assistance would be more effective than providing assistance
to individual firms, since the problems of firms are related
to the problems of the industry. A recent study of the
Footwear Revitalzation Program (FRP), an industry-wide TAA
program instituted under the Carter administration in 1977,
concluded that this program succeeded in raising investmnt
and productivity levels in the industry for the two years
following the FRP. The FRP took a comprehensive approach
to the industry's problems. It included teams of specialists
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to work with individual firms, streamlined trade adjustment
assistance, an export promotion campaign, the development of
new technologies (computer-aided stitching), a footwear
research center, loans and loan guarantees, and an orderly
marketing agreement. The program encouraged the domestic
industry to target the high fashion end of the shoe market,
rather than attempting to compete with low-wage producers for
the low end of the market. The American Shoe Center also
offered individual firms the benefits of economies of scale,
by making accessible new production technologies that indi-
vidual firms could not afford to invest in on their own.
Unfortunately, the increased productivity in the industry was
overshadowed by the increasing strength of the dollar beginning
in 1980. The current Industry-Wide TAA program contains
some of the same elements as the FRP, but it lacks the
strategic planning focus which made the FRP a success.87
In conclusion the TAA program for firms shows that it is
possible to save troubled firms. I argue that the federal
government should provide assistance to economically viable
troubled firms (or firms that can be made economically viable)
as long as aid is conditioned on increasing the competitiveness
of the firm and accounting for the interests of employees.
While the business strategies used to turn around the firms
in my case studies may restore competitiveness in the short
run, the long-range impacts are uncertain. The existing TAA
program could be more effective if it enjoyed a strong federal
8 7Michael Schlein, Memo to the Commission on the Future of
Mature Industries, 2/84 , pp. 2-4.
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commitment, delivered services more promptly, and involved
workers more in the restructuring of firms.
State Industrial Policy
A number of states are proposing policies to assist
distressed firms in mature industries, including Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, California, Ohio, and Michigan. This paper has
shown that the TAA program for firms can restore the competi-
tiveness of some firms. However, its effectiveness is
severjely limited by administrative and political problems.
Until the program is reorganized, I feel that the TAA program
for firms should be viewed by state economic development plan-
ners as one tool in their policy kit available to assist
troubled firms, but its administrative problems prevent it
from being the powerful policy tool that state governments
need to gain some control over the direction of their
economies.
Nevertheless, I think the TAA program provides some
important lessons for the design and limitations of state
industrial policy. First, if state programs are to succeed,
they must be able to deliver services fast and they must
enjoy some stability.
The TAA experience also provides some lessons on the
eligibility criteria for provision of assistance to firms.
Presumably, a state (or federal) industrial policy program
for aiding firms would have broader eligibility criteria
than import competition, but the firms to be aided will
probably be the same industries that are facing import
108
competition.
The most basic criterion for eligibility should be
economic viability of the firm. States should conduct
studies similar to the TAAC's diagnostic surveys to determine
whether a firm is economically viable or not. If a feasi-
bility study shows that it is not viable, then I feel there
is no economic or social rationale for assisting such firms.
However, states may be able to implement policies which change
the rules of the game for defining economic viability. For
example, a state could establish a product development fund
(similar to the Connecticut Product Development Corporation)
to assist firms in developing new products for which there are
markets. If the firm is to be allowed to close, then adjust-
ment assistance should be provided to the firm's employees
and the community.
If a state government with limited resources has to
choose between assisting two firms of equal economic viability,
then the state should select the firm which promises the
most benefits to its economic development. The Greenhouse
Compa-ct plan for Rhode Island proposes to target state assis-
tance to promote the development of high-wage industries--a
radical break from traditional state economic development
policy.88 As the federal TAA program becomes more strapped
for funds, it should also consider targeting -assistance to
firms that offer higher quality of employment.
8 8 Rhode Island Strategic Development Commission, The Greenhouse
Compact: Executive Summary, p. 29.
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State programs must also be insulated from politics.
Otherwise, decisions regarding aiding firms will be made
based on lobbying by industry associations, firm management,
patronage, and other noneconomic considerations. The program
should be staffed by qualified persons with business experience
who can make technical decisions. If these conditions are
not met, especially if the program is viewed as a "political"
process, it will not be as effective.
Besides the reasons I gave earlier for why government
should attempt to save economically viable but troubled firms,
I think there is an additional justification for state govern-
ments. Almost all state governments are currently pursuing
strategies to attract "high tech" industries. Recent
research shows that the number of jobs that will be generated
by these industries will not offset employment losses in
other sectors of the economy. Further, the industries promote
a bifurcated labor force, with a small number of good jobs
for highly trained people and larger numbers of low skill,
low wage jobs.89 The research also indicates that high
tech industries are not all high growth, so they are not the
uniform employment generators as is commonly believed.9 0
Given these problems with high tech development, states should
pursue balanced growth strategies for economic development,
8 9 Ann Markusen, "High Tech Jobs, Markets and Economic Develop-
ment Prospects: Evidence from California," Built Environment,
Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 18-21.
9 0 Amy Glasmeier, Peter Hall, and Ann Markusen, "Can Everyone
Have a Slice of the High-Tech Pie?" (Metropolitan High-
Technology Industry Growth in the Mid 1970's), Department of
City and Regional Planning, UC-Berkeley, 1983, pp. 7-8.
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and not just go after "winners." State economic development
programs must create good new jobs whenever possible, but the
retention and expansion of employment in existing firms must
be a high priority, especially if existing jobs are relatively
high skill and high wage jobs.
The federal program also reveals some of the limitations
of state industrial policy. The first point is that most
state governments will not have the financial resources neces-
sary to turn around some of their most distressed firms.
Few states can afford the $3 million loan guarantee given to
Anson, for example. Financial assistance may be affordable
in some cases. The best bet for states is to concentrate on
providing technical assistance to firms. Similar to the TAA
program, technical assistance can be provided for checking
the economic viability of the firm and diagnosing its problems,
developing a plan to improve the firm's performance, and making
the necessary changes in management, products, the production
process, or marketing. States should tap into the TAAC's
consultant network in order to line up consultants with a
good track record. This technical assistance will increase
the firms' chances of survival. It will reduce the perceived
risks of investing in these firms and make it easier for
them to obtain financing. States can also help firms obtain
financing from existing sources--the SBA, commercial banks,
venture capitalists, and public development finance institutions.
One of the most important--and discouraging--lessons of
the TAA program for state industrial policy makers is what
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state governments can and can't do. State governments may
attempt to increase the exports of their industries, but
these programs will be ineffective if states have no control
over national trade or macroeconomic policies. State govern-
ments can potentially deliver services to troubled firms
faster than the bureaucratic TAA program, but they can't
control the exchange rate--and this may impose the greatest
limitation on what states can do to revive their industries.
The trade weighted value of the dollar has increased 44% since
1980. This puts U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage both
in international and domestic markets.91 The strength of the
U.S. dollar is the main reason why Abbott has not been able to
market its product, even with the development of a techno-
logically competitive product. Unfortunately, Abbott is not
an isolated case. Spokespersons from the Department of
Commerce and the American Textile Machinery Association said
that the exchange rate is largely responsible for the non-
competitive position of almost all firms in the U.S. textile
machinery industry today. A researcher with the Massachusetts
Governors Commission on the Future of Mature Industries has
concluded that the strong U.S. dollar is the number one
reason why Massachusetts companies are having trouble com-
peting in their markets today, even companies that are at
the cutting edge of innovation in their industries.92 MIT
economist Lester Thurow has stated that industrial policies
9 1 Mature Industries Commission, March 1984 Draft, p. 8.
9 2 Interview with Siegel, 4/27/84.
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cannot work unless the federal government does something to
control the exchange rate. 9 3
Export programs are a part of many of the state industrial
policy plans, and they are doomed to failure unless the value
of the dollar falls. The centerpiece of Rhode Island's
Greenhouse Compact plan is a strategy for promoting the growth
of "traded" industries, industries which export their products
out of state. This strategy makes good sense in terms of the
greater economic benefits traded industries bring to a
regional economy. But these industries will be at a competi-
tive disadvantage in both world and domestic markets as long
as the dollar remains strong. It's not clear whether the
products of the new industries envisioned for Rhode Island
will be shipped overseas, but even if they are competing with
imports in domestic markets they will be at a price disadvantage.
In sum, the implications of the TAA program for state
industrial policy makers are that: Programs should be able
to deliver services promptly, on a stable basis, and in-
sulated from politics, and they should concentrate on pro-
viding technical assistance. Programs should have strict
eligibility criteria related to economic viability of the
firm, but state and federal policies may be able to make firms
economically viable. However, all of these design features
may be overshadowed by the fundamental inability of states
9 3Thurow, lecture, 4/23/84.
9 4 Rhode Island Strategic Development Commission, The Greenhouse
Compact: Executive Summary, pp. 29-32)
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to improve the competitive position of their industries when
they have no control over macroeconomic factors like the
strength of the dollar. This suggests that the federal
government, by stabilizing currency, will have to take the
initiative in creating a climate in which state or national
economic adjustment policies can work.
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Conclusion
In this paper I have 1-ooked at the TAA program for firms
from two different angles. First, how effective has the
program been in meeting its goal of making firms more
competitive? Secondly, what lessons do the program's ten
years of experience provide for the development of federal
and state policies for dealing with the problems of troubled
firms in industries facing declining competitiveness?
My evaluation of the program concluded that, in spite
of severe administrative and political problems, it has had
a positive impact on the economic performance of assisted
firms. Bureaucratic delays have produced long time periods
for receipt of assistance. The Reagan administration's attacks
on the program have created high staff turnover and uncertainty
about the program's future. Both factors have. reduced the
program's efficiency of service delivery. Nevertheless, the
84% survival rate of firms assisted by the program is much
higher than the survival rate of U.S. small businesses as a
whole. And the program appears to have improved the competi-
tive positions of the three firms in my case studies.
The case studies demonstrate a variety of strategies
for firms to improve their competitive positions--management
improvements, market niches (for products or services), new
product development, and modernizing the production process.
The major policy conclusion of this paper is that it is
possible for the government to save some troubled firms and,
further, that the government should attempt to save eco-
nomically viable firms as long as aid is conditioned on
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explicit agreements to increase the competitiveness of the
firm and account for the interests of workers. The paper also
pointed out that government policy can alter the business
environment to make some firms economically viable.
Management failure was found to be the most important
cause of firm failure in all three case studies. This
finding implies that the competitive restructuring of American
firms and industries will require, in addition to an expanded
role for government, highly creative business strategies on
the part of management that respond to the rapidly changing
conditions for doing business in an international market.
One problem is that, although the competitive strategies
adopted by U.S. firms and promoted by the TAA program have
restored short-term competi.tiveness, it's not clear whether
these strategies will ensure long-range competitiveness.
I recommended that the existing TAA program could be
improved by a strong federal commitment, reducing time
delays, and involving workers in planning the reorganization
of firms.
The TAA program offers some guidelines for the design
of industrial policies at the state level, but its experience
also suggests that states are limited in what they can do by
macroeconomic factors they have no control over, such as the
strength of the dollar. This suggests that some aspects of
industrial policy can only be planned at the federal level.
Finally, the broad goals of increasing the competitiveness
of U.S. firms and industries and easing the adjustment pains
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of workers and communities to structural economic change
might be better achieved if the United States developed a
coherent national industrial policy rather than relying on
programs like trade adjustment assistance to save the
victims of fragmented U.S. trade and industrial policies.
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APPENDIX I
Questionnaire for Firms
Background on Firm:
1. What does your firm produce?
2. What is the total dollar amount of your firm's assets?
3. How many employees?
Assistance:
1. How did you hear about the TAA program?
2. How long did it take you to be certified after you applied?
3. What problems caused you to apply for TAA?
4. What were the main problems with your firm, as revealed in
the diagnostic survey prepared by the New England TAAC
(management, market, etc.)?
5. The adjustment plan:
a. Did you have problems preparing it?
b. Did NETAAC assist you in preparing it? Consultants?
c. Could you summarize the adjustment plan?
6. What types of technical assistance did NETAAC provide?
Did you use outside consultants, too? How did that work out?
7. What financial assistance was provided? Did you experience
any delays in receiving the loans?
8. If you hadn't received assistance, would you still be in
business?
9. Since receiving TAA, have your sales improved? Productivity?
(numbers)
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10. As a result of adjustment assistance, have you made any
changes affecting your labor force (layoffs, expansion, re-
training, relocation, higher or lower wages)? Are any such
changes planned?
11. Did you get along with the TAAC staff?
12. In general, how would you describe your experience with the
TAA program? How could it be improved?
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APPENDIX II
Questionnaire for Firms
Background on Firm:
1. What does your firm produce?
2. Size of firm
a. Total sales (range will do)
b. Number of employees
Assistance:
1. How did you hear about the TAA program?
2. Why did you go to the TAA program? (Probe to get a sense
of firm's condition, impact of foreign competition)
3. Did the TAAC conduct a pre-diagnostic survey? If so, what
did it show?
4. What were the main problems with your firm, as revealed in
the diagnostic survey prepared by NETAAC?
5. What were the main points of the adjustment plan?
a. Did you have problems preparing it?
b. Did NETAAC assist you? Consultants?
6. How was the recovery plan implemented?
a. What types of technical assistance did NETAAC provide?
Did you use outside consultants, too? Were you involved
in choosing the consultants? How long after certification
did you receive technical assistance?
b. What financial assistance was provided? How long did it
take to receive loans after certification?
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7. What impact has the assistance had on your firm?
a. If you hadn't received assistance, would you still be in
business?
b. Describe changes in your firm's position since receiving
TAA--financial, sales, productivity, market share. Is
your firm more competitive with imports now?
c. To what extent do you attribute these changes to TAA?
8. (Probe to get a sense of how the recovery plan affected the
interests of firm's workers)
a. As a result of adjustment assistance, have you made any
changes affecting your labor force (layoffs, expansions,
higher/lower wages, automation, deskilling)?
b. Are any changes planned?
c. If the recovery plan included new technologies for plant,
did it include provisions for training? If plan involved
layoffs, any provisions for retraining? Relocation
assistance for laid-off employees?
9. How would you evaluate the services provided by the TAAC?
a. Did you get along with staff?
b. How helpful/professional were their services?
10. Evaluate services provided by consultants:
a. Did you get along with consultants?
b. How helpful/professional were their services?
11. In general, how would you describe your experience with
the TAA program? How could it be improved?
12. What do you think about the government providing assistance
to private firms?
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13. Is there anyone else I should talk to about your firm's
experiences with TAA? Is your plant unionized? (If yes,
get union contact.)
14. Do you have any printed information on your firm (annual
reports, promotional materials on products) or press clippings
describing your experiences with the TAA program?
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